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1. Introduction
Fiscal Councils, as technical bodies in charge of 
monitoring and assessing compliance with bud-
getary, fiscal and even macroeconomic indicators, 
and acting independently from political (and thus 
fiscal) authorities,2 have been established since the 
1960s, albeit in a minority of countries.3 Although 
2. According to the set of ‘Principles for Independent 
Fiscal Institutions’ drafted within the OECD frame-
work in 2012, Fiscal Councils are ‘publicly funded in-
dependent bodies under the statutory authority of the 
executive or the legislature which provide non-parti-
san oversight and analysis of, and/or advice on, fiscal 
policy and performance’.
3. The most notable example being perhaps the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office, in operation since 1975: 
see Nooree Lee (2008), Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974, Reconsidered, in Brief-
ing Paper no 34, Harvard Law School, University of 
Harvard, p. 1 ff. and Philip G. Joyce (2011), The Con-
gressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Powers, and 
Policy Making, Washington D.C., Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, p. 207 ff. In Europe, most Fiscal Councils 
have been established since 2009, thus in connection 
with the financial crisis. See OECD, Parliamentary 
Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions, 
4th annual meeting, Background document no 3 for 
the Session on Discussion on Draft Principles for In-
dependent Fiscal Institutions, Paris, 23-24 February 
scholars and international and supranational or-
ganisations have always underlined the impor-
tance of such institutions for having sound public 
accounts and sustainable growth, it was only in 
the new century that the financial and the Euro 
crises gave the most significant input for the set-
ting up of Fiscal Councils, in particular in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) Member States.4
2012, p. 2.
4. See Lars Calmfors (2011), What should Fiscal Coun-
cils do?, CESifo Working Paper No. 3382, March 2011, 
available at: www.cesifo.org/wp and Sergio Fabbrini 
(2012), I quattro doveri della politica verso i cittadini, 
in Il Sole24Ore, 19 September, p. 1. As for the position 
of the International Monetary Fund, see Anthony An-
nett et al. (2005), Reforming the Stability and Growth 
Pact, in IMF Policy Discussion Paper, 05/2, available 
at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2005/
pdp02.pdf, and Manmohan S. Kumar and Teresa Ter-
Minassian, eds. (2007), Promoting Fiscal Discipline, 
Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund; 
the OECD recommended the establishment of Fis-
cal Councils in several Economic Surveys by Country, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys; in the 
EU the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission have always supported the setting up of 
such institutions: see, for example, European Central 
Bank (2010), Reinforcing Economic Governance in the 
In the last few years both national governments 
and EU institutions have made the establishment 
of Fiscal Councils in the Member States compul-
sory. Indeed, Fiscal Councils have been identified 
as one of the tools for limiting the growth of pub-
lic deficits and debts, favouring the adoption of 
more responsible and technically-meditated po-
litical decisions.
To date, the literature has mainly focused on the 
impact of Fiscal Councils for maintaining tight 
fiscal discipline and on the effectiveness of their 
role as ‘watchdogs’, examining their independence 
from the fiscal authorities, namely, the parlia-
ment and the executive. However, this debate 
seems vitiated by the bias of treating these two 
branches of government as though they under-
took the same role within the budgetary and fiscal 
decision-making process. Instead, a more care-
ful look at the relevant national discipline reveals 
that, in parliamentary forms of governments, such 
as those of most EU Member States, the national 
parliaments are usually less influential on fiscal 
Euro Area, 10 June, p. 7 ff., and European Commis-
sion (2010), Enhancing Economic Policy Coordination 
for Stability, Growth and Jobs – Tools for Stronger EU 
Economic Governance, COM(2010) 367/2, Brussels.
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decisions and less equipped with information on 
fiscal policy than the executives.5 This evidence 
is further strengthened by the fact that the Euro-
pean measures of the new economic governance, 
urging tighter fiscal discipline, in principle reduce 
the room that national parliaments have for ma-
noeuvre and, instead, increase the degree of the 
inter-governmentalism of the decision-making 
process.6
Moreover, the position of Fiscal Councils needs to 
be framed within the particular context of the EU 
and of its Member States, in which the national 
parliaments have normally been considered as the 
‘latecomers’ or the ‘losers’ of the European integra-
5. See, for example, Riccardo Pelizzo et al (2005), The 
Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process, Washington 
DC, World Bank Institute.
6. On the ‘new wave’ of inter-governmentalism brought 
by the new economic governance, see Paolo Ponzano 
(2011), Méthode intergouvernementale ou méthode 
communautaire: une querelle sans intérêt?, in Les Brefs 
the Notre Europe, n. 23, p. 2-3, Uwe Puetter (2012), Eu-
rope’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the 
Council and European Council in EU economic govern-
ance’, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, n. 
2, p. 161-178, and Sergio Fabbrini (2013), Intergovern-
mentalism and Its Outcomes: The Implications of the 
Euro Crisis on the European Union, in LUISS School of 
Government Working Paper Series, n. 1, forthcoming.
tion process.7 However, since the Treaties of Maas-
tricht and Amsterdam, and most evidently since 
the Treaty of Lisbon national parliaments have 
gradually experienced an upgrade of the their role 
in the EU. National parliaments have constantly 
transformed and adapted themselves, from their 
marginalisation,8 then Europeanisation,9 and fi-
nally to their rehabilitation and strengthening in 
the EU.10 The establishment of Fiscal Councils, in-
dependent of, but accountable to, the parliaments, 
can possibly enhance the role of parliamentary in-
stitutions in the European framework and in the 
7. The expressions ‘losers’ and ‘latecomers’ referred to 
national parliament in the EU are taken from Andre-
as Maurer & Wolfgang Wessels, eds. (2001), National 
Parliaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or Late-
comers?, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag.
8. See Philipp Kiiver (2006), The National Parliaments in 
the European Union: a Critical View on EU Constitu-
tion Building, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, p. 
15 ff.
9. See, for example, Katrin Auel (2005), Introduction: The 
Europeanization of Parliamentary Democracy, in Jour-
nal of Legislative Studies, vol. 11, n. 3-4, p. 303-318.
10. On the rehabilitation, in prospects, of national Parlia-
ments in the EU, see John O’Brennan & Tapio Raunio, 
eds. (2007), National Parliaments within the enlarged 
European Union: from Victims of Integration to Com-
petitive Actors?, London-New York, Routledge.
economic governance. Fiscal Councils can provide 
parliaments with a further source of information, 
independent from the executive, whose legitimacy 
relies on the technical competence and the merit 
of its members. By monitoring the executive on 
the grounds of the financial effects of its policy 
options, by providing macroeconomic forecasts, 
and by making the results of their analyses pub-
licly available, Fiscal Councils are not only able to 
improve the credibility and the transparency of 
fiscal decisions, but they can also re-inforce par-
liamentary ex ante scrutiny and oversight on bud-
getary matters, and, ultimately, the weight of the 
parliaments in European economic governance. 
In other words, depending on the constitutional 
system and on the political culture of the Member 
State concerned, an independent Fiscal Council 
can also affect the parliament-executive relation-
ship, in terms of inter-institutional balance and in 
terms of the outcomes of the current euro-nation-
al fiscal procedures.
Thus, set within the present debate on the chang-
ing role of the national parliaments in the EU, the 
paper is intended to examine, by means of a com-
parative analysis, the setting up of Fiscal Councils 
under the perspective of national representative 
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assemblies, and tries to answers the following re-
search question: To what extent and under what 
conditions can Fiscal Councils contribute to im-
prove the position of the national parliaments 
within the framework of the European econom-
ic governance, in particular in their relationship 
with the national executives?
In the end, the establishment of a re-inforced co-
operation between the parliament and the Fiscal 
Council can contribute to strengthen the inde-
pendence of the latter and to promote a more ef-
fective implementation of fiscal rules.
The paper is devised as follows. Section 2 consid-
ers the crucial feature of the independence of Fis-
cal Councils, to be assessed differently when look-
ing at the parliaments or at the executives; Section 
3 refers to the theoretical framework of the paper, 
the tension between the marginalisation and the 
enhancement of national parliaments in the EU, 
and how it is affected by the setting up of Fiscal 
Councils; Section 4 analyses how the European 
measures, either those in force or those whose 
adoption has been almost completed, can connect 
Fiscal Councils to the national parliaments; Sec-
tion 5 analyses the setting up of Fiscal Councils in 
five case-studies, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy 
and the UK, selected upon the basis of the institu-
tional architecture in the national systems, of the 
relationship between the Fiscal Council and the 
parliament, and of the moment of creation of in-
dependent fiscal agencies. Finally, Section 6 tries 
to draw the first conclusions about the effects of 
the establishment of Fiscal Councils on the posi-
tion and the powers of the national parliaments 
in the EU.
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2. Fiscal Councils... Independent from the 
Government or from the Parliament?
In describing the institutional features that the 
specific Fiscal Councils, of the Member States, 
have in common, the literature has usually cast its 
attention on those fundamental rules which tend 
to grant such institutions a consistent degree of au-
tonomy from the political bodies and non-parti-
sanship. In particular, what has been clearly point-
ed out is that the mandate of the Councils must 
satisfy several criteria,11 concerning the nature of 
the agency’s mandate (which should be ‘unambig-
uous and achievable, and the delegated respon-
sibility should have an economic rationale’), the 
way in which the Council fulfils its tasks (it must 
be granted complete autonomy in carrying out its 
mission), and, above all, its relationship with the 
political sphere (which should make the Council 
fully independent of the governing institutions). 
11. See Robert Hagemann (2010), Improving Fiscal Perfor-
mance through Fiscal Councils, in OECD - Economic 
Department Working Paper n. 829, 9 December, avail-
able at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/economicsdepart-
mentworkingpapers.htm, p. 14; Lars Calmfors (2011), 
What should Fiscal Councils do?, cit., p. 16 ff.
The pre-requisite of the independence from po-
litical influence, in its turn, has been reflected in 
a variety of rules (the so-called ‘firewalls’), confer-
ring: the autonomy from politics in the Council’s 
appointment of members and staffing (which can 
be evaluated by looking at the nature of the ap-
pointees, at who makes the appointment, at the 
relationship of the appointees from politics and at 
the staffing rules and procedures);12 the formal in-
fluence exercised by the agency in the budget and 
fiscal process (in this field, what should be taken 
into consideration is the nature of the agency’s 
mandate, its policy objectives and its area of ac-
12. Lars Calmfors (2011), The Role of Independent Fiscal 
Policy Institutions, in CESifo Working Paper n. 3367, 
February 2011, available at: www.cesifo-group.org/
wp ,p. 19-20; Lars Calmfors (2011), What Should Fis-
cal Councils Do?, cit., p. 16 has insisted on the possibil-
ity of achieving the independence of a Fiscal Council 
through: appointment procedures that seek to guaran-
tee professionalism and the ground for appointment; 
long and non-renewable periods of office for the insti-
tution’s decision-making body; restrictions on the gov-
ernment’s freedom to fire the members of the institu-
tion’s decision-making body.
tivities, its influence on government activity, and 
its formal role in the budget process carried out 
by the parliament); the Council’s funding (which 
is supposed to grant the agency its own revenues 
and a degree of autonomy in the management of 
its accounts), and the accountability rules (confer-
ing, above all, the ‘collective’ accountability of the 
Council in the face of the government and of the 
parliament).13
Most investigations of the functional and struc-
tural features which should characterise all Fiscal 
Councils are based upon a basic assumption: that 
a Fiscal Council can potentially contribute to im-
proved fiscal performance only if it is granted ef-
fective independence from both the government 
executive and the parliament. The main reason 
behind the creation of such an agency is, in fact, 
to be found in the opportunity to limit political 
influence in the technical aspects of fiscal-policy 
formulation or monitoring, and to provide for 
macroeconomic forecasts which are free of any 
13. According to Lars Calmfors (Ibidem), ‘a council which 
is not held accountable in the short run may risk its in-
dependence in the long run’, as it may get into conflict 
with the government which may then want to restrict 
its independence or reformulate its tasks.
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significant bias which, in their turn, may contrib-
ute to improve the transparency of fiscal decisions 
and to increase the public awareness of the bud-
getary performance.14 In other terms, the creation 
of a Fiscal Council is justified by the decision to 
delegate some aspects of fiscal policy to an un-
elected, but nonetheless accountable, body, thus 
creating an antidote to deficit bias;15 this does not 
imply a delegation of authority - with regard to the 
fiscal policy - to the fiscal agency, whose mandate 
14. Among other, see Robert Hagemann (2010), Improv-
ing Fiscal Performance through Fiscal Councils, cit., p. 
10-11; Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), 
The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, in J. Ayuso-i-Casals, 
S. Deroose, E. Flores and L. Moulin eds., European 
Economy - Economic Papers, n. 275, April 2007, p. 32, 
and Tatiana Kirsanova, Campbell Leith and Simon 
Wren-Lewis (2007), Optimal Debt Policy, and an In-
stitutional Proposal to Help its Implementation, ivi, p. 
288 ff. Among the Italian literature, see Daniele Cabras 
(2012), Un Fiscal Council in Parlamento, in http://www.
federalismi.it/ , 17 October.
15. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), Fiscal 
Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment De-
vices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?, in IMF Work-
ing Papers Series, 29 March, p. 479 ff., available at: 
www.ssrn.com.
is usually limited to the analysis and assessment of 
fiscal developments and policies.16
For these reasons, the so-called ‘independence’ 
factor is considered to be the necessary prem-
ise for enabling the agency to affect fiscal-policy 
choices, and, according to part of the literature, 
to contribute to improved fiscal performance.17 
There are two ways to endow a Fiscal Council with 
effective independence:18 by building up a solid 
reputation for impartial and competent analysis; 
and by setting up formal rules which protect the 
Fiscal Council from external interference. Given 
that the first solution, based upon the technical 
reputation of the agency, is likely to take time, the 
second option is the one most often adopted when 
first establishing a Fiscal Council.
The above-described approach, which clearly in-
terprets the interaction of Fiscal Councils-elected 
bodies as a possible vulnus in the guarantee of the 
16. Xavier Debrun, David Hauner & Manmohan S. Ku-
mar (2007), The Role for Fiscal Agencies, in M.S. Ku-
mar, T.T. Minassian (eds.), cit., p. 107.
17. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), Fiscal 
Rules, Fiscal Councils, cit., p. 485 ff.
18. Lars Calmfors (2011), What should Fiscal Councils do?, 
cit., p. 13.
agency’s independence and seems to find wide-
spread favour in the literature, would need more 
cautious reflection. There is no doubt that any 
agency in charge of evaluating fiscal-policy formu-
lation and implementation requires full autonomy 
from the subject in charge of the policy-making 
process in parliamentary forms of government, 
i.e., the government: an adequate level of separa-
tion between the two institutions would turn the 
monitoring mechanism into a self-control activity 
devoid of real utility. This observation, however, 
cannot be completely applied to the relationship 
between Fiscal Councils and parliaments. From 
the functional point of view, the fiscal policy-mak-
ing does not fall completely within the domain of 
the legislative body, which, in this field, is usually 
empowered with more control than decision-
making power. At the same time, from a structural 
point of view, it is unequivocal that the parliament 
does not embody a single political position, as is 
the case of the government, but, that through the 
confrontation between the majority and the op-
position, it is able to offer those democratic checks 
and balances which represent, in themselves, a 
guarantee of independence.19
19. See Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider, Jan Zápal 
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For all these reasons, the present paper embraces 
a different approach to the relationship between 
Fiscal Councils and representative assemblies, 
based upon the idea that such interaction would 
not invalidate the fulfilment of the Fiscal Coun-
cil’s mandate, but would, instead, enrich the over-
all functioning of the ex ante and ex post scrutiny20 
circuit.21 This perspective implies that the pre-req-
(2005), A Fiscal Rule that Has Teeth: a Suggestion for 
a ‘Fiscal Sustainability Council’ Underpinned by the 
Financial Markets, in CESifo Working Paper n. 1499, 
July, p. 17 ff., available at: www.ssrn.com. The authors, 
in fact, propose the creation, at the European Union 
level, of a Fiscal Sustainability Council (FSC) in order 
to contribute to solve the bias of national governments 
excessive deficits. To work properly, the FSC ‘must be 
independent from regular political-cycle considera-
tions, i.e., it must be shielded from member countries’ 
national governments’. This remark does not prevent 
the authors from considering as recommended a close 
relationship between the FSC and the national Parlia-
ments of the EU, which for instance should select and 
appoint FSC members.
20. In the present paper we use ‘oversight’ and ‘ex post 
scrutiny’ as synonyms, when describing the control set 
in place by Parliaments on the implementation of the 
executive’s policies.
21. Many Fiscal Councils exercise, at the same time, both 
a forecasting and a monitoring activity, which respec-
tively occupy the ex ante and the ex post stage. As ob-
served by John Kay (2010), A fiscal watchdog has no need 
uisite of the Fiscal Council’s independence should 
instead be described in terms of co-operation and 
mutual support between the agency and the par-
liament. In this regard, it can be argued that Fiscal 
Councils, particularly when they have strong ties 
with parliaments, can re-inforce the position of 
the latter – traditionally seen as weak actors – in 
national decision-making processes dealing with 
the EU and fiscal matters (Section 3).
The soundness of such a thesis is assessed by con-
sidering two different levels of analysis as relevant. 
First of all, attention is brought to the European 
norms concerning the establishment of fiscal 
agencies, evaluating whether the functional and 
structural requirements concerning the creation 
of such bodies take (and in what ways) the rela-
tionship with the parliament into consideration 
(Section 4). 
Secondly, some national experiences are deep-
ened, with the purpose of empirically assessing 
of a crystal ball, in The Financial Times, 22 September, 
‘governments cannot be relied on both to set targets and 
to monitor compliance with these targets’; as a conse-
quence, the job which Fiscal Councils have, or should 
have, ‘is therefore more akin to audit than to forecast-
ing’.
what the (formal and informal) interaction be-
tween the existing (and the forthcoming) Fiscal 
Councils and respective legislatures actually is 
(Section 5). In order to isolate the different fac-
tors which influence such a relationship, five na-
tional cases have been selected, representing, re-
spectively: two Fiscal Councils established long 
before the present the economic and financial cri-
sis, and characterised by a solid relationship with 
the executive (Germany and Belgium); the United 
Kingdom’s Office for Budget Responsibility, a fis-
cal agency created during the Eurozone crisis (but 
formally not as an adaptation to EU law) which is 
closely-related both to the parliament and to the 
government; and two newly-established fiscal in-
stitutions (Italy and France), created in order to 
comply with the EU requirements.
With the purpose of evaluating the relationship 
linking such fiscal institutions with the legislative 
branch, four elements are taken into account in 
considering national experiences: the role exer-
cised by the parliament in the appointment proce-
dures; the capacity of the Fiscal Council to inter-
act with the legislative process carried out at par-
liamentary level, and the procedures accompany-
ing the submission and discussion of the agency’s 
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fiscal reports within the representative assemblies; 
the dependence of the Council’s funding on a de-
cision to be taken at parliamentary level; and the 
accountability rules which assure an evaluation 
of the elected assemblies with regard to the Fiscal 
Council’s activity.
3. National Parliaments in the European 
Union: Marginalisation, Europeanisation, 
Revival?
Since the inception of the European Communi-
ties (EC), national parliaments have not fulfilled a 
primary role in the integration process. They have 
not been placed in a position in which they have 
real weight and actually count: when they were di-
rectly represented in the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the EC, this inter-parliamentary institution was 
simply a consultative body; after the first election 
of the European Parliament (EP) and, at least, un-
til the 1990s, national parliaments were kept apart 
from the new decision-making powers assigned 
to the ‘Assembly for Europe’.22 National legisla-
tures could prove to be effectively influential only 
22. The expression here is drawn from David Marquand 
(1979), Parliament for Europe, London, Jonathan Cape, 
p. 64-66, who advocated for the EP’s direct elections 
and empowerment. Yves Mény (2011), Can Europe be 
Democratic? Is it Feasible? Is it Necessary? Is the Present 
Situation Sustainable?, in Fordham International Law 
Journal, vol. 34, n. 5, p. 1297, affirms that the EP ‘plays 
a role that many national Parliaments could envy’.
at the moment of voting the authorisation to ratify 
European treaties and their revisions.23
However, in the early 1990s, it was argued that 
the position of the national parliaments in the 
EU was extremely weak.24 Because of the prin-
ciples of supremacy and of direct effect, the laws 
at first approved by the national parliaments can 
be superseded by European norms,25 provided 
23. This was the case of the veto opposed by the French As-
semblée Nationale to the Treaty on the European De-
fence Community in 1954. Such veto led to the failure 
of the project of a European Defence Community in 
the years to come.
24. For instance, before the Treaty of Maastricht was 
drafted, at the end of 1991, Joseph H.H. Weiler (1991), 
The Transformation of Europe, in The Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 100, n. 8, Symposium: International Law, p. 2430, 
affirmed that ‘the executive branches of the Member 
States often act together as a binding legislator outside 
the decisive control of any parliamentary chamber’.
25. See the ‘Factortame saga’ and its impact on the UK 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty: in particular 
the decision of the Court of Justice on The Queen v Sec-
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that they fall within the remit of the EU. More-
over, when European legislative acts were enacted, 
the parliaments in the Member States ‘could not 
have second thoughts or control their content at 
the national, implementing level’, nor was a ‘tight 
ex ante control by national Parliaments on the 
activities of ministers in Community fora’26 effec-
tively in place at that time. However, some parlia-
ments were (and possibly are) less marginal than 
others: an exception was, for instance, the Danish 
parliament.27 Its model of binding mandate to the 
executive before the adoption of decisions in the 
retary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd 
and others, Case C-213/89 of 19 June 1990, ECR I-2433; 
the subsequent decision of the House of Lords of 11 
October 1990, 2 LLR 365 and the following decision 
of the Court of Justice, Case C-221/89 of 25 July 1991, 
ECR I-3905.
26. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 
cit., p. 2430.
27. Françoise Mendel (1980), The Role of Parliament in 
Foreign Affairs in Denmark, in A. Cassese (ed.) Parlia-
mentary Control over Foreign Policy, Verlag-New York, 
Springer, p. 53-57 and, more recently, Finn Laursen 
(2001), The Danish Folketing and Its European Affairs 
Committee: Strong Players in the National Policy Cycle, 
in: A. Maurer & W. Wessels (eds.), National Parlia-
ments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or Latecomers?, 
cit., p. 99-116.
Council of Ministers of the EC has inspired sev-
eral other parliaments, although this mechanism 
was not replicated in precisely the same form in 
other Member States.
It is widely-acknowledged that parliaments are 
probably the most adaptable institutions to the 
changes in constitutional arrangements.28 In spite 
of the century-old thesis of their institutional 
decline,29 not only do parliaments exist in any 
democratic system, within or beyond the nation-
al level of government,30 but they have also been 
able to undertake a variety of functions that has 
never been matched by any other institutions,31 
28. On the factors that favour and limit the institutional 
change, see Douglass C. North (1990), Institutions, In-
stitutional Change and Economic Performance, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 27 ff.
29. See James Bryce (1921), Modern democracies, vol. II, 
New York, Macmillan, p. 367.
30. The Inter-parliamentary Union, the international 
organization of Parliaments established in 1889, is 
composed of 190 member Parliaments, of the United 
Nations Member States, plus 10 associate members, 
which are regional or supranational Parliaments. See 
http://www.ipu.org.
31. See Charles H. McIlwain (1947), Constitutionalism An-
cient and Modern, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 
rev. ed., p. 93 ff. and Phillip Norton (2010), La nature 
thus re-inventing themselves at any time. With 
regard to the participation of the national parlia-
ments in the EU, again, a never-ending process of 
institutional adaptation has taken place, particu-
larly when, after 1979, the parliaments lost their 
physical linkage to European institutions through 
the European Parliament.32 This process, which 
has been described as ‘Europeanisation’, can be 
understood as a reaction to the national parlia-
ments’ self-perception of ‘marginalisation’ in the 
European decision-making process.33
du contrôle parlementaire, in Pouvoirs, n. 134, p. 5. Par-
liaments have acted as courts, as comptrollers and as 
legislators and, under exceptional circumstances, such 
as revolutions, also as executive authorities. Recently, 
even an ‘international networking function’ has been 
recognised to national Parliaments: see Tapio Raunio 
(2012), From the Margins of European Integration to the 
Guardians of the Treaties? The Role of National Parlia-
ments in the EU, in: S. Kröger & D. Friedrich, The Chal-
lenge of Democratic Representation in the European 
Union, London, Palgrave MacMillan, p. 180. 
32. See Phillip Norton (1996), Introduction: Adapting to 
European Integration, in P. Norton (ed.), National Par-
liaments and the European Union, London, Routledge, 
p. 1-11.
33. See Katrin Auel (2005), Introduction: The Europeaniza-
tion of Parliamentary Democracy, cit.; Robert Ladrech 
(2010), The Europeanisation of National Politics, Lon-
don, Palgrave Macmillan; Tapio Raunio & Matti 
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Thus, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the national parlia-
ments, on the one hand, entails a form of emula-
tion of the most active legislatures – for example, 
the Danish Folketing and the UK House of Com-
mons and House of Lords; interestingly enough, 
in two traditionally Eurosceptic countries – for 
what concerns, for instance, the relationship be-
tween the parliament and the government in EU 
matters (the conferral of a mandate, the scrutiny 
of European documents for addressing the ex-
ecutive’s conduct in the EU, and the introduction 
of parliamentary scrutiny reserve). Although, in 
principle, leading to a sort of convergence with re-
gard to the model of parliamentary participation 
in EU affairs, in practice, ‘Europeanisation’ can 
also determine differentiation amongst national 
systems. On the other hand, this phenomenon re-
Wiberg (2010), How to Measure the Europeanisation 
of National Legislature?, in Scandinavian Political 
Studies, vol. 33, n. 1, p. 74-92; Astrid Spreitzer (2011), 
Measuring the Europeanisation of national parlia-
ments, paper presented at the International Workshop 
‘Changing Modes of Parliamentary Representation’, 
organized by IPSA RCLS and RECON WP3, 14-15 Oc-
tober, Prague; and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2012), Europe-
anisation, in: E. Jones, A. Menon & S. Weatherill, (eds.) 
The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, p. 825-839.
sults in the attempt pursued by each parliament, 
strictly under the national perspective, to adapt its 
procedures and organisation to the EU decision-
making process in the most suitable way to control 
and influence it. Throughout this adaptation pro-
cess, the procedures and the organisation adopted 
could also differ a great deal from one parliament 
to another, taking the institutional, the political 
and the social features of the Member State con-
cerned into account. This implies, for example, the 
choice of the shape and the composition of the 
parliamentary committee on European affairs or 
the preference for the schedule of parliamentary 
business that best accommodates the schedule of 
the European legislative process with the needs of 
the national context.34 Parliaments can be more or 
34. There is one further dimension of ‘Europeanisation’, 
concerning the impact of European Union on national 
policies, that is not analysed here, since the present pa-
per, although focused on fiscal and budgetary policies, 
is intended to examine the setting up of Fiscal Coun-
cils in terms of institutional balance and of possible 
strengthening of national Parliaments rather than 
dealing with the effects of national Fiscal Councils on 
the actual implementation of those policies. On the 
‘Europeanisation’ of national policies, see Adrienne 
Héritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehm-
kuhl, Michael Teutsch & Cécile Douillet (2010), Differ-
ential Europe: The European Union Impact on National 
less successful in their ‘Europeanisation’, depend-
ing on national constraints: thus, different levels 
of parliamentary ‘Europeanisation’ do exist.
These two dimensions of the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of national parliaments, i.e., emulation and dif-
ferentiation, both inherent to this process of ad-
aptation, have been consolidated, while a gradual 
re-habilitation of the role of national parliaments 
in the EU has been fostered by the revisions of 
the Treaties, under the pressure of addressing the 
democratic problems of the European architec-
ture.35 Two Declarations (n. 13 and 14) annexed 
to the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), firstly, and the 
protocols on the role of the national parliaments 
and on the application of the principle of subsid-
iarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1999), subsequently, provided for 
Policy-making, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 
and Sylvain Brouard et al., eds. (2012), The Europeani-
zation of Domestic Legislatures: The Empirical Implica-
tions of the Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries, New York, 
Springer.
35. See, for example, the decision of the German Constitu-
tional Court on the Treaty of Maastricht of 12 October 
1993, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, when it was 
stressed that ‘the German Federal Parliament must re-
tain functions and powers of substantial importance’.
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the first recognition – by European sources of law 
– of the involvement of the national parliaments 
in EU procedures, albeit indirectly, through their 
relationship with the national executives. A few 
years later, the national parliaments directly par-
ticipated in the procedure for drafting European 
Treaties, although this procedure, ‘the convention 
method’, was not codified at that time: compared 
to the other components (the national govern-
ments, the EP, the Court of Justice, etc.) of the 
Conventions in charge of elaborating a first draft of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms and of the Constitutional Treaty, MPs were 
the largest component, although possibly not the 
most prominent in terms of decision-making ca-
pacity, even considering the amendments pushed 
forward by the subsequent inter-governmental 
conferences.36
36. See Bruno de Witte (2005), European Treaty Revi-
sion: a Case of Multilevel Constitutionalism, in: I. Per-
nice & J. Zemanek (eds.), A Constitution for Europe: 
The IGC, the Ratification Process and Beyond, Baden 
Baden, Nomos, Verlag, p. 59-76 and Florence Deloche-
Gaudez (2007), La convention européenne sur l’avenir 
de l’Europe: ruptures et continuités, in: G. Amato, H. 
Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds.) Genèse et destinée de 
la Constitution européenne: commentaire du traité 
établissant une constitution pour l’Europe à la lumière 
The failed Constitutional Treaty and finally the 
Treaty of Lisbon, in particular, seemed to support 
an effective revival of the role of the national par-
liaments in the EU compared to the past.37 Many 
provisions of the Treaties, as modified by the Trea-
ty of Lisbon, are promising in terms of the nation-
al parliaments’ redemption from their previous 
marginalisation, starting from Article 12 TEU and 
from Protocols 1 and 2. For instance, the national 
des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’avenir, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, p. 47-86.
37. See Paolo Ridola (2006), The parliamentarisation of the 
institutional structure of the European Union between 
representative democracy and participatory democra-
cy, in H.-J. Blanke & S. Mangiameli (eds.), Governing 
Europe Under a Constitution, Heildeberg-New York, 
Springer, p. 415 ff.; Marta Cartabia (2007), Prospects 
for national parliaments in EU affairs - What should 
and could be saved in the case of non-ratification?, in 
G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds.), Genèse 
et destinée de la Constitution européenne, cit., p. 1081-
1104; Gavin Barrett (2008) ‘The King is dead, long live 
the King’: The Recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the 
Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty concerning Na-
tional Parliaments, European Law Review, vol. 33, n. 
1, p. 66-84; and Andrea Manzella (2009) The Role of 
Parliaments in the Democratic Life of the Union, in: S. 
Micossi and G. L. Tosato (eds.), The European Union 
in the 21st century. Perspectives from the Lisbon Treaty 
(Brussels: CEPS), p. 257-270.
parliaments now receive a direct flow of informa-
tion, documents and draft legislative acts from the 
European Commission (Protocol 1, Articles 49 
TEU and 352 TFEU), the control the compliance 
of legislative proposals with the principle of sub-
sidiarity, they can challenge the validity of legisla-
tive acts before the Court of Justice through their 
governments (Protocol 2),38 participate in the re-
38. Maybe the participation of the national parliaments 
in the early warning mechanism has been the sub-
ject of most contributions on legislatures in the EU 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, since the procedure raises 
several issues (individual-collective participation of 
national Parliaments, their role vis-à-vis national Ex-
ecutives, the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment, the conditions and the suitability for trigger-
ing the thresholds of the so-called ‘yellow and orange 
cards’). However, the assessment given to the early 
warning mechanism in terms of national Parliaments’ 
empowerment in the EU varies a lot: Pieter De Wilde 
(2012), Why the Early Warning Mechanism does not 
Alleviate the Democratic Deficit, in OPAL Online Pa-
per n. 6, p. 6, considers the mechanism as useless; by 
contrast, some others, such as Ian Cooper (2006), The 
Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and 
the Logic of Arguing in the EU, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 44, n. 2, p. 281-304, presents it in 
very positive terms; finally, others (see Philipp Kiiver 
(2012), The Early Warning System for the Principle of 
Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and Empirical Re-
ality, London, Routledge, p. 71 ff. and Federico Fab-
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vision of the Treaties (Article 48 TEU), can veto 
the use of the ‘passerelle clause’ (Article 48.7 TEU) 
and the adoption of European measures in fam-
ily matters which have transnational implications 
(Article 81.3 TFEU), are involved in the political 
monitoring of Europol and in the evaluation of 
Eurojust (Articles 12 TEU and 85 and 88 TFEU), 
and also take part in the inter-parliamentary co-
operation with the EP (Article 12 TEU and Pro-
tocol 1).
Thus, Europeanisation and the strengthening of 
the national parliaments have progressed side by 
brini and Katarzyna Granat (2013), ‘Yellow Card, but 
Not Foul’: The Role of the National Parliaments Under 
the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal 
for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, in Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 50, p. 115-144, forthcoming), 
although recognising the revolutionary significance of 
the mechanism, argue that enabling political bodies, 
such as Parliaments, to carry out a legal control on the 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could be 
problematical in practice. However, as for the institu-
tional influence of national parliaments in the EU, it 
should be mentioned that the first yellow card raised 
by national legislatures ever, on the draft regulation 
on the right to take collective action in the field of the 
freedom of establishment and of the freedom to pro-
vide services, led to the withdrawal of the proposal on 
the part on the Commission in September 2012.
side, and the two main features of Europeanisa-
tion, differentiation and emulation, are still the two 
sides of the same coin. On the one hand, although 
European Treaty provisions set a common frame-
work for the national parliaments of all the Mem-
ber States, national implementation has achieved 
different results. For example, in Germany, under 
the auspices of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have been signif-
icantly strengthened by the enactment (on the in-
put of the constitutional jurisprudence) of a series 
of measures which enable them to delay or even 
to block the participation of the national govern-
ment in EU decision-making procedures (even up 
to the point of threatening to block the entire de-
cision-making process, and not just for Germany), 
whenever parliamentary assent is lacking.39 By the 
39. This has been the position taken by the German Con-
stitutional Court, in particular, in its judgment of 30 
June 2009 on the Treaty of Lisbon (2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 
5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 and 
2 BvR 182/09). See the Special Issue of the German Law 
Journal on The Lisbon Judgment of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, vol. 10, n. 8, 2009; Arndt Wonka (2010), 
Accountability without Politics? The Contribution of 
Parliaments to Democratic Control of EU Politics in the 
German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling, and Ul-
rike Liebert (2010), More Democracy in the European 
same token, in the UK, the approval of the Euro-
pean Union Act 2011 has led to the conferral of 
veto powers to the UK parliament (in addition to 
those already introduced by the Treaties), in par-
ticular to the House of Commons, as well as some 
clauses that provide for the combination of pass-
ing legislation or motions by the parliament and 
of the positive result of a referendum in order for 
the executive to take action at EU level.40
On the other hand, on the part of other national 
parliaments, the will to emulate the position of 
the ‘most protected’ legislatures, with regard to 
the prerogatives acknowledged at national level 
Union?! Mixed Messages from the German Lisbon Rul-
ing, in: A. Fischer-Lescano, Ch. Joerges and A. Wonka 
(eds.), The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Rul-
ing: Legal and Political-Science Perspectives, ZERP Dis-
cussion Paper 1/2010, Zentrum Für Europäische Re-
chtspolitik, Universität Bremen, respectively, p. 55 ff. 
and p. 71 ff; Matthias Wendel (2011), Lisbon Before the 
Courts: Comparative Perspectives, in European Consti-
tutional Law Review, vol. 7, n. 1, p. 96-137; and Chris-
tian Calliess (2012), The Future of the Eurozone and the 
Role of the German Constitutional Court, in Yearbook 
of European Law, vol. 31, n. 1, p. 402-415.
40. See Paul Craig (2011), The European Union Act 2011: 
Locks, Limits and Legality, in Common Market Law Re-
view, vol. 48, n. 6, p. 1915-1944.
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for the participation in the EU decision-making 
process, induced the adoption of provisions which 
resemble – as much as possible – those in place 
in the ‘leading Parliaments’.41 Indeed, a clear trend 
can be identified among the national parliaments: 
the process of European integration and particu-
larly the revisions obtained by means of the Treaty 
of Lisbon have promoted the re-inforcement of 
the parliamentary function which deals with the 
ex ante scrutiny and with the oversight, at the ex-
pense of other functions, in primis the legislative 
one, which has been increasingly absorbed by the 
EU legislators.42
Is the picture of the progressive emancipation of 
the national parliaments in the EU overturned by 
the present reform of the economic governance? 
41. This was the case of Spain and of the approval of Law 
no 24/2009 and the case of Italy, which has recently 
enacted Law no 234/2012.
42. See Olivier Costa, Eric Kerrouche and Paul Magnette 
(2004), Le temps du parlementerisme désenchanté, in: 
O. Costa, E. Kerrouche and P. Magnette (eds.), Vers un 
renouveau du parlementerisme en Europe?, Brussels, 
ULB, p. 17, and Cristina Fasone (2011) Gli effetti del 
Trattato di Lisbona sulla funzione di controllo parla-
mentare, in Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comuni-
tario, n. 2, p. 353-391
The hypothesis of the national parliaments’ regres-
sion towards marginalisation appears to be taken 
for granted, because of the constraints placed 
upon the budgetary authority of the national 
parliaments, which disallows them to step in di-
rectly at EU level during the Euro-national fiscal 
procedures. The only opportunity for the direct 
involvement of national legislatures, according to 
the new measures, is provided by the setting up 
of a ‘conference of representatives of the relevant 
committees of the European Parliament and rep-
resentatives of the relevant committees of national 
Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies 
and other issues covered by’ the Treaty on Stability, 
Co-ordination and Governance in the economic 
and monetary Union (TSCG).43 Although it has 
become increasingly important,44 the formula of 
the inter-parliamentary co-operation does not 
43. See Article 13 TSCG, which refers to Protocol 1 on the 
role of national Parliament in the European Union an-
nexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.
44. See Andrea Manzella (2012), Is the EP Legitimate as a 
Parliamentary Body in EU Multi-tier Governance?, in 
Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in the EU, Work-
shop organised by the Policy Department of the EP on 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Brussels, 4 
October.
entail the conferral of decision-making powers to 
legislatures, nor does it guarantee their effective 
influence.
Once more, the ability of national parliaments to 
institutional adaptation is challenged: they have 
to follow the deadlines of the European Semes-
ter, the substantial standards fixed at EU level on 
the budget and on macroeconomic indicators, 
and the European-driven balanced-budget clause 
when passing legislation.45 The impairment of the 
position of the national parliaments is potential-
ly much more serious that that triggered by the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and by the first version of the Stability and 
45. As underlined by Giacomo Delledonne (2012), Finan-
cial Constitutions in the EU: From the Political to the 
Legal Constitutions?, in STALS Research Paper, n. 5, p. 
4, the (preferable) constitutionalisation of the balanced 
budget clause seems to cause a ‘shift from a (prevail-
ing) political to a (would-be) legal notion of financial 
constitutions’, thus implying a diminished role for 
political institutions, in particular for Parliaments, in 
favour of judicial or more technical actors (according 
to the existing tension between political and legal con-
stitutionalism: see Richard Bellamy (2007), Political 
Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Con-
stitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 1-12.
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Growth Pact (SGP) in the 1990s. As shown by the 
soft implementation of the first SGP (Section 4), 
the role of the national fiscal authorities, including 
the parliaments, was limitedly affected, since they 
were not bound, as they are now, to negotiate the 
content of the budgetary and fiscal decisions with 
the EU institutions, and nor was the budget cycle 
shaped through a Euro-national process.
However, at present, the national executives room 
for manoeuvre has also been limited by the new 
European measures, in a much more severe way 
compared to the former SGP, particularly because 
of the semi-automatic implementation of the 
system of warnings and sanctions.46 The institu-
tional balance between fiscal authorities, namely, 
the parliaments and the governments, is likely to 
change in the light of the new economic gover-
nance mechanisms, although the ‘losers’ and the 
46. See Nicola Lupo (2012), La revisione costituzionale del-
la disciplina di bilancio e il sistema delle fonti, in V. Lip-
polis (ed.), Costituzione e pareggio di bilancio, Il Filan-
gieri – Quaderno 2011, Naples, Jovene, p. 89-144 and 
Elena Griglio (2012), Parliamentary oversight of natio-
nal budgets: recent trends in EU Member States, paper 
presented on the occasion of the Tenth Workshop of 
Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, 28-29 
July, Wroxton College, UK.
‘winners’ are not the same everywhere. Again, the 
features of the national constitutional systems are 
extremely significant, as the case of Germany and 
of its federal parliament shows. The disclosure and 
the transmission to the Bundestag of the informa-
tion gained by the executive in this field, in par-
ticular in the EU, and the power of the parliament 
to bind the position of the executive concerning 
the most significant decisions on fiscal policy 
within European institutions and summits, have 
been made mandatory by the German Constitu-
tional Court in order to preserve the link between 
democratic representation and the legitimacy of 
financial decisions.47 At the same time, even at 
47. See, for example, the latest judgment of the federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany issued on 12 Sep-
tember 2012 (2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 
1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, 
anticipated by other judgments of 7 September 2011, 
of 27 February 2012 and of 19 July 2012), on the con-
stitutionality of the ESM and the TSCG. See also Antje 
von Ungern-Sternberg (2012), Parliaments - Fig Leaf 
or Heartbeat of Democracy? German Federal Consti-
tutional Court (Judgment of 7 September 2011 - Euro-
pean Rescue Package), in European Constitutional Law 
Review, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 304-322; Daniel Thym (2012), 
The German Constitutional Court – or: the Emperor’s 
New Clothes, and Peter L. Lindseth (2012), Karlsruhe 
Capitulates? Hardly – Understanding the ESM Ruling 
European level, some prospective tools have been 
introduced in order to enhance the position of the 
national parliaments: perhaps the most important 
of them is the Fiscal Council. The effectiveness 
of the parliamentary action on these matters de-
pends on the ability of each national parliament 
to ‘exploit’ the independent source of information 
of the Fiscal Council and to establish a mutually 
co-operative relationship.
As has been argued, if the financial and fiscal cri-
sis in the European Union is, indeed, a crisis of 
democracy,48 assessing whether national parlia-
ments are further limited as fiscal authorities or 
whether they can instead contribute to the new 
European economic governance mechanisms, 
of September 12, both published in EutopiaLaw, on 17 
September 2012, available at: www.eutopialaw.com.
48. See Miguel Poiares Maduro (2012), A New Govern-
ance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy 
and Justice, RSCAS Policy Paper 2012/11, p. 3 ff., and 
Christian Joerges (2012), A European Union of, by and 
for the citizens. How can Europe provide better possibil-
ities for the participation of its citizens?, Contribution 
to the European Parliament – Committee on Consti-
tutional Affairs – Hearing on citizen participation, 18 
September 2012.
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thus finding a new impetus in the mutual co-op-
eration with the Fiscal Councils, appears crucial.49
49. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Bruno de Witte and Mat-
tias Kumm (2012), The Euro Crisis and the Democratic 
Governance of the Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a 
Fiscal Crisis, in M. Poiares Maduro, B. de Witte and M. 
Kumm (eds.) The Democratic Governance of the Euro, 
RSCAS Policy Paper 2012/08, p. 3 stresses the fact that 
the fundamental problem deals with ‘the democratic 
quality of the euro governance’.
4. Fiscal Councils and the National 
Parliaments in the Economic Governance: 
The European Union Framework
The need to face the financial crisis and the fail-
ure of the system built up on the 1997 SGP (EU 
Regulations n 1466 and 1467/1997), has created 
the urgent need of the introduction of stricter rules 
for controlling compliance with the new economic 
regulatory framework, limiting the ‘connivance’ 
amongst Member States in the event of a violation of 
fiscal standards. Such a result has been pursued by:
•	 empowering the Commission as the general 
guardian of compliance with fiscal rules and 
against macroeconomic imbalances and mak-
ing the adoption of warnings and sanctions 
semi-automatic;
•	 strengthening the judicial control on fiscal 
rules. On the one hand, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, which adopted a very 
cautious position when it dealt with the misap-
plication of the previous Stability and Growth 
Pact,50 has become entitled to judge on the cor-
rect introduction of the balanced-budget clause 
(and possibly also of its enforcement) in the na-
tional legal systems,51 according to Articles 3(2) 
50. See the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Case 
C-27/04 of 13 July 2004, Commission v Council, ECR 
I-06649, and the comments by the Common Market 
Law Review editorial board (2004), Whither the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact?, in Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 41, n. 5, p. 1193; Dimitrios Doukas (2005), The 
Frailty of the Stability and Growth Pact and the ECJ: 
Much ado about Nothing?, in Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, vol. 32, p. 293; Barbara Dutzler and Ange-
lika Hable (2005), The European Court of Justice and 
the Stability and Growth Pact – Just the Beginning?, in 
European Integration online Papers, vol. 9, n. 5, http://
eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-005a.htm; Guido Rivosec-
chi (2007), L’indirizzo politico finanziario tra Costituz-
ione italiana e vincoli europei, Padua, Cedam, 2007, 
p. 410 ff. The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 
by Regulations n. 1055 and 1056/2005 has not sub-
stantially changed the picture: see Jean Victor Louis 
(2006), The Review of the Stability and Growth Pact, in 
Common Market Law Review, vol. 43, n. 1, p. 85.
51. See Bruno de Witte (2012), European Stability Mecha-
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and 8 TSCG. On the other hand, after the (pref-
erable) constitutionalisation of the balanced-
budget clause, the jurisdiction of Constitutional 
Courts has been extended, too; and by
•	 introducing, by means of Fiscal Councils, a 
more technical control on the compliance with 
the new provisions on the part of national ex-
ecutives.52
Thus, although Fiscal Councils were already in 
function in 11 Member States in 2011,53 it was 
only at the apex of the financial and of the fiscal 
crises that the EU made the establishment of Fis-
cal Councils in national systems mandatory. All 
nism and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gov-
ernance: Role of the EU Institutions and Consistency 
with EU Legal Order’, in Challenges of Multi-tier Gov-
ernance in the EU, Workshop organised by the Policy 
Department of the EP on Citizens’ Rights and Consti-
tutional Affairs, Brussels, 4 October.
52. See Giacomo Delledonne (2012), Financial Constitu-
tions in the EU: From the Political to the Legal Consti-
tution?, cit., p. 5.
53. The Member States which Fiscal Councils operated 
before the reform of the economic governance are: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Member States are now bound to the duty to set 
up this independent institution.54
From the functional point of view, the ‘mandate’ of 
the Fiscal Councils on the part of the EU is quite 
broad, since only the drafting of macroeconomic 
forecasts and plans can ‘escape’ their ‘jurisdiction’, 
depending on the choice of each Member State, 
which can either split tasks amongst different in-
stitutions or concentrate them on the Fiscal Coun-
cil. According to Directive 2011/85/UE, on the re-
quirements for the budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States, this institution is to be in charge 
of the independent, effective and timely monitor-
ing of country-specific fiscal rules and ‘to enhance 
54. See Paul Craig (2012), The Stability, Coordination and 
Governance Treaty: Principles, Politics and Pragma-
tism, in European Law Review, n 37, p. 236. The UK, 
although it is not part of the TSCG and it is not sub-
ject to the provisions of Directive 2011/85EU regarding 
Fiscal Councils, also seems to be bound to guarantee 
the operation of such institution (which is already in 
function in the UK under the name of Office for Budg-
et Responsibility). Indeed, according to the European 
Commission Communication COM (2012) 342, the 
existence of a Fiscal Council has to put in relation with 
the functioning of the correction mechanism in case 
of deviation from the medium-term objective, which 
concerns also the UK.
the transparency of elements of the budget pro-
cess (Article 2.2, lit. f)’. The TSCG, an international 
agreement signed by all Member States, except the 
UK and the Czech Republic, on 2 March 2012, and 
which entered into force on 1 January 2013, estab-
lishes a link between the functioning of the correc-
tion mechanism and the Fiscal Councils (Article 
3.2). Indeed, Fiscal Councils are held responsible 
at national level for monitoring the compliance of 
the Member State concerned with the balanced-
budget clause and with the convergence towards 
the country-specific medium-term objective. It is 
evident that the Fiscal Councils are not deemed 
to be decision-making authorities and that, in any 
event, they could not endanger or ‘compete with’ 
national parliaments. However, what remains un-
solved in the TSCG with regard to Fiscal Councils 
is whether the Court of Justice is entitled, accord-
ing to Article 8 TSCG, to review also issues related 
to these bodies. With regard to the wording of Ar-
ticle 8(1) TSCG, which simply mentions Article 
3(2) TSCG, the jurisdiction of the Court of Jus-
tice, relying on Article 273 TFEU, in principle also 
seems to affect the correct establishment of Fiscal 
Councils and probably their functioning.
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According to the TSCG, the Commission has pro-
vided a set of common principles for the Fiscal 
Councils, by defining their ‘core functions’ (Prin-
ciple 7, Annex to the Communication of the Com-
mission of June 2012 (COM (2012) 342). They 
have to oversee the appropriate functioning of the 
correction mechanism in each Member State, in 
case of deviation from the medium-term objec-
tive. In particular, at a national level, Fiscal Coun-
cils are responsible for controlling whether the 
circumstances which might warrant the activation 
of the correction mechanism occur; whether the 
correction mechanism, when activated, is correct-
ly implemented in the Member State; and whether 
the escape clauses, under special conditions (for 
example, in order to face natural disasters), are 
properly used. Thus, the Fiscal Councils are en-
titled to carry out both the ex ante and the ex post 
control on budgetary matters. However, what is 
more important is the power which, according to 
the Communication, has to be acknowledged to 
the Fiscal Councils: their recommendations bind 
the Member States. Indeed, if the latter do not 
comply with the assessments of the relevant Fiscal 
Council, the Member States must ‘explain publicly 
why they are not following’ them. Although the 
Communication is not formally binding on the 
Member States, the fact that it contains the com-
mon principles on the correction mechanisms 
seems to recognise a specific legal value to Prin-
ciple 7, which cannot be neglected.
With regard to the structural features of the Fis-
cal Councils, their setting up has to fit within 
‘the already existing institutional setting and the 
country-specific administrative structure (Article 
3.2 TSCG)’. In terms of the prospective impact of 
the Fiscal Councils on the national parliaments, 
the reference to the existing institutional setting 
appears extremely important. Not only must ef-
fective Fiscal Councils be set up in ways which 
are consistent with the institutional arrangements, 
the legal culture and the tradition of the state con-
cerned, regardless of benchmarks provided by 
other countries, but the establishment of the Fis-
cal Councils must not jeopardise the position of 
the national parliaments. Thus they can maintain 
or even strengthen the role of the parliaments.
Moreover, the basic structural requirement intro-
duced by the EU for the Fiscal Councils is their 
‘functional autonomy’ vis-à-vis the budgetary au-
thorities of the Member States (Article 6, Directive 
2011/85 CE). Looking at the wording of the new 
measures, it seems that the requirement of ‘func-
tional autonomy’ is possibly less demanding than 
that posed by other European norms for supervi-
sory authorities and for establishing the condition 
of the ‘complete independence’.55 However, it has 
to be taken into account that the Court of Justice 
has already sanctioned some Member States, and 
in particular Germany, on this issue, interpreting 
the independence of supervisory authorities in 
strict terms, aiming to protect them against any 
political pressure.56
In detail, the list of the conditions for guarantee-
ing the functional autonomy of Fiscal Councils 
are contained in the Communication on national 
fiscal correction mechanisms (COM (2012) 342) 
and are about to be codified in one of the draft 
regulations of the ‘two-pack’, the proposal on 
common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
55. See, for example, Article 28 of the Directive 95/46 EC 
of 24 October 1995, on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data.
56. See the decisions of the Court of Justice in Commission 
v Germany, Case C-424/07 of 3 December 2009, ECR 
I-11431, and Commission v. Germany, Case C-518/07 of 
9 March 2010, ECR I-1885.
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draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction 
of the excessive deficit of the Member States in the 
euro area (COM (2011) 821).57
1. ‘A statutory regime grounded in law’. The Fis-
cal Councils can be regulated not only at con-
stitutional, but also at statutory, level, given 
the broad meaning assigned to the word ‘law’ 
in the European Union.58 However, it can be 
argued that, aiming at protecting the inde-
pendence and even the existence of the Fis-
cal Councils, the strongest guarantee would 
have consisted in having their basic discipline 
57. For the time being, after long negotiations, the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament have just reached a 
compromise at the first reading on this draft Regula-
tion, originally presented on 23 November 2011. If the 
amendments of the EP of 13 June 2012 had been ac-
cepted by the Council, the ties between national Par-
liaments and Fiscal Councils would have been much 
stronger in terms of accountability than in the current 
final text.
58. See Alexander H. Türk (2006), Concept of Legislation 
in European Community Law: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
p. 11 ff. and Mark Dawson (2011), New Governance and 
the Transformation of European Law: Coordinating EU 
Social Law and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, p. 92 ff.
contained in the Constitution or in an organic 
law.59
2. ‘Freedom from interference’, which involves 
the autonomy of the Fiscal Councils from in-
structions imposed by other institutions and 
the possibility of disclosing information both 
promptly and whenever it is deemed neces-
sary.
3. ‘Nomination procedures based on experience 
and competence’, which underlines the techni-
cal nature of the Fiscal Councils, whose mem-
bers are selected upon the basis of their merit 
and expertise with the participation of the 
parliaments in the appointment procedure.
4. ‘Adequacy of resources and information’, ac-
cording to which the size of the staff and the 
stock of financial resources is to be proportion-
59. On the importance of having Fiscal Councils regulated 
preferably at constitutional level, see Daniele Franco 
(2011), Comments on ‘The Role of Fiscal Policy Coun-
cils in Theory’ by Xavrier Debrun, Presentation held at 
the Conference on ‘Fiscal Policy Councils: Why do we 
need them and what makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 
January 2011, available at: http://www.staatsschulde-
nausschuss.at/en/staatsschuldenausschuss.jsp 
ate to the scope of the mandate attributed to 
Fiscal Councils.
Although the legal acts examined do not explic-
itly bind Member States to set up Fiscal Coun-
cils within the executive or within the parlia-
ment, given that it is taken for granted that Fiscal 
Councils are independent institutions, they do, 
however, intend to emphasise that these bodies 
enjoy a special relationship with parliaments. On 
the one hand, national legislation is requested to 
introduce the most suitable tools for making the 
Fiscal Councils accountable to the parliaments; 
on the other, national measures have to prevent 
any ‘unwarranted interference’ on the part of the 
Fiscal Councils’ mandate with that of the fiscal 
authorities (or vice versa), which might limit the 
prerogative of the national parliaments. The new 
European measures design Fiscal Councils which 
are able to provide the national parliaments with 
independent information, to make the budgetary 
process and the approval of fiscal decisions more 
transparent and understandable, and to enhance 
the parliamentary scrutiny and oversight of the 
complex Euro-national decision-making process. 
With this regard, looking at the European frame-
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work, the Fiscal Councils can be deemed to sup-
port the national parliaments in facing the risk of 
a ‘new marginalisation’ within the economic gov-
ernance.
The real arrangement of the relationship between 
the Fiscal Councils and the parliaments, however, 
is strongly influenced by the national legal system 
and by the duties imposed upon the Member States 
to implement the new provisions. Indeed, a possi-
ble differentiation in the relationship between the 
parliaments and the Fiscal Councils across the EU 
countries is likely to emerge not simply because of 
the different constitutional architecture and iden-
tity of the Member States, but also because a multi-
speed Europe does exist when looking at the EU 
economic governance.60 Given the fact that some 
measures are addressed to all the Member States, 
60. See Nicolas de Sadeleer (2012), The New Architecture 
Of The European Economic Governance: A Leviathan 
Or A Flat-Footed Colossus?, in Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, vol. 19, n. 3, p. 380-
381; J-C. Piris (2012), The Future of Europe: Towards 
a Two-Speed EU?, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 106 ff.; Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger and 
Franck Schimmelfenning (2013), Differentiated Inte-
gration. Explaining Variation in the European Union, 
London, Palgrave MacMillan, p. 142-183.
others to all the Member States, with the excep-
tion of the Czech Republic and the UK, others to 
23 countries,61 and finally others only to the coun-
tries of the Eurozone, different legal and economic 
constraints can produce a further differentiation 
in the reaction of the national parliaments, in the 
tasks assigned to the Fiscal Councils and in their 
reciprocal relationship. Moreover, as the serious-
ness of the fiscal crisis also varies across countries 
– i.e., there are debtors and creditors countries – a 
single and common model of the Fiscal Council in 
the EU cannot be easily found at present, although 
the EU measures encourage a sort of convergence 
towards independent fiscal institutions which are 
accountable to the parliaments.
61. Indeed, all the Member States have been committed to 
comply with the Europe Plus Pact agreed by the Euro-
pean Council on 25 March 2011, except Sweden, Hun-
gary, the Czech Republic and the UK.
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5. Assessing the Relationship between the 
Fiscal Councils and the Representative 
Assemblies at National Level
The comparison of the selected case studies is 
based upon the assumption that the relationship 
between the Fiscal Councils and their respective 
parliaments is influenced by two main factors: 
the economic, political and legal context in which 
the fiscal institutions have been established; and 
the capacity of the legislature to develop budget-
ary and financial scrutiny autonomously of the 
performance of the executive. These two factors 
will be considered separately in the following sub-
sections.
5.1 The Influence of the 
Economic, Political and 
Legal Context on the Role 
and the Position of Fiscal 
Councils
As briefly explained in Section 2, the five national 
Fiscal Councils considered in the present contri-
bution have been established in very different eco-
nomic, political and legal contexts. This external 
factor seems to have influenced the rules concern-
ing the overall position of the independent body 
in the relationship with the other institutional 
bodies, and in particular with the executive and 
the legislative branches.
5.1.1 The Long-established Fiscal 
Councils: the German and 
Belgian Cases
Germany and Belgium experienced the creation 
of fiscal agencies long before the current econom-
ic and financial crisis. In particular, the German 
Council of Economic Experts was set up by law 
in 1963 as an academic body which could serve 
public- and economically-relevant institutions 
in making informed judgements on questions of 
economic policy. The two Belgian fiscal institu-
tions, the High Council on Finance and the Na-
tional Auditing Office, were set up respectively in 
1936 and in 1994, but their aptitude for acting as 
fiscal councils has gradually grown with the evo-
lution of the Belgian constitutional system over 
the last few decades.62 In particular, two processes 
have impacted upon the role of the above-men-
tioned organisms: the regionalisation of the Bel-
gian state, which began at the end of the 1980s and 
formally concluded with the constitutional reform 
of 1994, when the country became a federal state 
with three Regions and three Communities;63 and 
62. The Council was created with the Royal Decree of 31 
January 1936 whose purpose was to unify within a sin-
gle advisory body the different consultative commit-
tees created within the Minister of Finance. The Coun-
cil, which after the Second World War had ceased to 
function, was rediscovered at the end of the 1960s, 
thanks to the Royal Decree n. 17 dated 23 May 1967, 
and was then periodically reformed in order to adjust 
it to the emerging institutional needs and reduce the 
risk of political interference. With the reform of 1981, 
in particular, the area of intervention of the Council, 
originally referred to the fiscal, economic and finan-
cial policy-making, was extended also the budgetary 
decision-making. See Henry C. Wallich (1968), The 
American Council of Economic Advisers and the Ger-
man Sachverstaendigenrat. A Study in the Economics of 
Advice, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 82, 
n. 3, p. 349 ff.
63. The regionalisation of the Belgian State created the 
premises for the reform of the High Council of Fi-
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the entry of Belgium into the European Monetary 
Union, which meant that it had to respect the 
Maastricht parameters.64
Both in Germany and in Belgium, the above-men-
tioned fiscal agencies are clear examples of gov-
ernment-centred institutions; this feature emerges 
from the rules concerning the internal structure 
nance, occurred in 1989 with the aim of entrusting the 
Council with the task to monitor the fiscal policy of 
regional governments and to formulate medium-term 
financial objectives for the federated entities. See Aloïs 
Van de Voorde & Georges Stienlet (1995), Le Budget 
de l’État dans la Belgique fédérale, 5th ed., Brussels, 
CEPESS, passim.
64. The establishment of the European Monetary Union 
urged the creation, in 1994, of the National Accounts 
Institute (law of 21 December), as an independ-
ent body which could exercise a general oversight of 
budget and test the reliability of the economic statistics 
and macroeconomic forecasts upon which the budget 
was based. See Henri Bogaert, Ludovic Dobbelaere, 
Bart Hertveld & Igor Lebrun (2006), Fiscal Councils, 
Independent Forecasts and the Budgetary Process: Les-
sons From the Belgian Case, Federal Planning Bureau, 
Working paper n. 4-06, p. 1-2, available at: www.plan.
be (also published by Igor Lebrun (2007), Fiscal coun-
cils, independent forecasts and the budgetary process: 
lessons from the Belgian case, in: J. Ayuso-i-Casals, S. 
Deroose, E. Flores & L. Moulin, European Economy - 
Economic Papers, n. 275, April, p. 337 ff.)
of the body, and, in particular, from those con-
cerning the appointment procedures.
The German Council of Economic Experts is en-
dowed with complete independence in the perfor-
mance of its work (it is only bound by the man-
date set forth in the Act on the Appointment of 
a Council of Experts on Economic Development, 
dated 14 August 1963), but the agency’s main in-
stitutional point of reference is to be found in the 
government. According to Article 7 of the Ap-
pointment Act, the five members of the Council 
of Economic Experts are selected from among 
specialists in the field of economic theory and 
economic policy,65 and are appointed by the Fed-
eral President on recommendation of the Federal 
government.66
65. The independence of the agency from other institu-
tional bodies is guaranteed also by the rules banning 
the appointment of members exercising institutional 
duties or in a position of conflict of interest disciplined 
by Article 1.3 of the Act on the Appointment of a 
Council of Experts on Economic Development.
66. Their mandate lasts five years and they can be reap-
pointed; in order to assure full independence to the 
advisory body, the Federal Government must hear the 
members of the Council of Experts before nominat-
ing a new member; the Chairperson is chosen by the 
Council among one of its members for three years. See 
The Belgian National Accounts Institute (NAI) is a 
compound institution, whose duties are delegated 
to three associated institutions67 and whose mul-
tifaceted composition68 is simultaneously meant 
to represent the associated institutions and the 
Belgian linguistic groups.69 The High Council of 
Norbert Kämper (1989), Der Sachverständigenrat zur 
Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwiklung, 
Berlin, Duncker & Humblot.
67. The Statistics Belgium (collecting the data to be used 
for the production of statistics), the National Bank of 
Belgium (responsible of the production of statistics for 
the national and regional accounts, the foreign trade 
statistics, the financial accounts) and the Federal Plan-
ning Bureau (in charge of the short-term macroeco-
nomic forecasts); these last two institutions are jointly 
responsible for the general governmental account.
68. The most significant decisions, in fact, are adopted 
by the board of directors, composed of seven mem-
bers, four appointed in compliance with the law and 
the other three members (the General Secretary of 
the Ministry for economic affairs, who represents the 
Minister and is in charge of the Chair of the Board; 
the Governor of the National Bank of Belgium, the Ad-
ministrator and the Director of the National Institute 
of statistics) appointed by the King (Article 113 of the 
law of 21 December 1994).
69. The mandate of the board’s members lasts four years 
and re-appointment is permitted. According to Arti-
cle 115 of the law of 21 December 1994, moreover, a 
Counselling committee, composed of representatives 
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Finance70 is, instead, composed of the Plenary 
Council,71 of two sections and a Working group 
on ageing. Its membership reflects its close rela-
tionship with the government.72
Both the NAI and the High Council of Finance, 
therefore, tend to find their institutional referent 
not only in the Federal government, but also in the 
governments of the other federated entities. The 
result is thus a plurality of institutional interlocu-
tors, which makes political intervention quite dif-
ficult, as the credibility of all the institutions in-
volved is at stake.
of the Federal Government, of the National economic 
or fiscal agencies and of the regional Governments, ap-
pointed by the King (for the Federal level), is in charge 
of addressing every year some recommendations to 
the Board of Directors in order to ameliorate the fulfil-
ment of the Council’s duties.
70. As disciplined by the Arrêté royal of the 3 April 2006.
71. The Plenary Council is chaired by the Minister of Fi-
nance, it includes two vice-Presidents appointed by the 
Minister of Finance and by the Minister of Budget and 
is composed of 24 experts in economic and budgetary 
subjects, representing either the Federal Government 
or the regional Governments and appointed on five-
years renewable terms by the King.
72. The Secretariat of the Council is ruled by officials of 
the Federal Ministry of Finance.
5.1.2 The British Office for Budget 
Responsibility: A Recent 
Fiscal Council Created on a 
Voluntary Basis
If the German and Belgian fiscal independent 
bodies can be inscribed within the government-
oriented agencies, a different model is provided by 
the British Office for Budget Responsibility, creat-
ed in 2010 and disciplined by the Budget Respon-
sibility and National Audit Act 2011, as an inde-
pendent agency entitled to provide authoritative 
analysis of the UK’s public finance.
Endowed with a high degree of autonomy from 
other institutions,73 the Office’s independence op-
73. The Office’s independence in performing its mandate 
is in particular guaranteed by the fact that the agency 
is subject only to its statutory duties and to the guid-
ance of the Charter for budget responsibility, presented 
by Government to Parliament pursuant to Section 1 of 
the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 
and related to the formulation and implementation of 
the fiscal policy and of the policy for the management 
of national debt. HM Treasury (2011), Charter for 
Budget Responsibility, April 2011, available at: http://
budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/wordpress/
docs/charter_budget_responsibility040411.pdf
erates in contact with the government,74 which 
nonetheless does not prevent it from maintain-
ing strong ties with the parliament. The first tie 
comes from the internal composition of the body: 
the Chair of the Office (according to Schedule 1 
of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit 
Act 2011), in fact, is appointed by the Chancellor 
of Exchequer, but with the consent of the Treasury 
Committee of the House of Commons (HoC); a 
further two members are appointed by the Chan-
cellor of Exchequer, but after consultation with the 
Chair and with the consent of the Treasury Com-
74. A specific Memorandum of Understanding, published 
in April 2011, for instance, sets out the agreed work-
ing relationship between the Office, HM Revenue and 
Customs, the Department for Work and Pensions, and 
HM Treasury (Office for Budget Responsibility - HM 
Treasury (2011), Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween Office for Budget Responsibility, HM Treasury, 
Department for Works and Pensions and HM Revenues 
& Customs, April, available at: http://86.54.44.148/
wordpress/docs/obr_memorandum040411.pdf). As 
part of the Office’s commitment to transparency, 
moreover, the institutional website of the agency pub-
lishes, among other information, also the list of con-
tacts held by Office members with ministers, special 
advisers, private offices and opposition MP’s. Available 
at: http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/
transparency/disclosures.
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mittee of the HoC;75 these three members consti-
tute a committee, known as the Budget Responsi-
bility Committee. The rest of the Office (not fewer 
than two members) are nominated by the Office 
and appointed by the Chancellor of Exchequer; 
these members constitute a committee which is 
known as a non-executive committee. This com-
position assures the Treasury Committee control 
of at least three of the Office’s members, of which 
one acts as Chair. It is important to emphasise that 
only the three members appointed with the con-
sent of the Treasury committee are members of 
the executive committee of the Office – the Bud-
get Responsibility Committee – to whom the ex-
ercise of most of the relevant assessment duties is 
reserved, as disciplined by Section 4 (3) and (4) of 
the Act; the Non-executive committee, in contrast, 
must review the way in which the Office’s duties 
are performed.
75. The consent of the HoC Treasury Committee is not re-
quired for the appointment in some cases, disciplined 
by par. 3 (1) of Section 1 of the Budget Responsibility 
and National Audit Act 2011.
5.1.3 The ‘Latest’ Fiscal Councils, 
Established in Italy and in 
France in order to comply 
with EU Obligations
If the Office for Budget Responsibility can be 
considered an example of a Fiscal Council cen-
tred both on the parliament and on the govern-
ment, the last two fiscal institutions created by EU 
Member States – the Italian Parliamentary Budget 
Office and the French High Council of Public Fi-
nances – reveal an even stronger relationship with 
the legislative branch.
In particular, the Italian Parliamentary Budget 
Office represents a unique example (at least in 
Europe) of a Fiscal Council that is strongly par-
liamentary-centred. The new agency was formally 
introduced by Article 5, Section 1, (f) of the Con-
stitutional Law no 1/2012 in April 201276 as an 
76. The reform introduced in the Italian Constitution the 
balanced budget rule; for further details, see Antonio 
Brancasi (2012), L’introduzione del principio del cd. 
pareggio di bilancio: un esempio di revisione affrettata 
della Costituzione, in Quaderni costituzionali, n. 1, p. 
108 ff. and Daniele Cabras (2012), Il pareggio di bilan-
cio in Costituzione: una regola importante per la stabi-
lizzazione della finanza pubblica, ivi, p. 111 ff.; Renzo 
independent body to be created by the Chambers, 
with due respect of their constitutional autonomy; 
and entitled to analyse and assess the public-fi-
nance trends and to monitor the respect of bud-
getary rules.77 The Office’s internal composition 
Dickmann (2012), Legislazione di spesa ed equilibrio 
di bilancio tra legittimità costituzionale e legittimità 
europea, 16 May, in http://www.federalismi.it/; Paola 
Bilancia (2012), Note critiche sul cd. ‘pareggio di bi-
lancio’, in Rivista AIC, 17 April, available at: www.as-
sociazionedeicostituzionalisti.it); Nicola Lupo (2012), 
La revisione costituzionale della disciplina di bilancio 
e il sistema delle fonti, cit., p. 89 ff. and Tania Groppi, 
Irene Spigno & Nicola Vizioli (2012), The Constitution-
al Consequences of the Financial Crisis in Italy, avail-
able at: www.astrid.eu. The Italian Fiscal Institution 
could be therefore classified within the fiscal agencies 
with a solid, constitutional basis and a defined area of 
intervention, due to the fact that, at the same time, it 
enjoys a constitutional status and it operates with a 
fiscal rule established on a constitutional basis. See 
Daniele Franco (2011), Comments on ‘The Role of Fis-
cal Policy Councils in Theory’, cit., 31 January. On the 
importance that fiscal rules have in order to make the 
model based on the advisory role of Fiscal Councils re-
ally work, see also Chiara Goretti (2012), Pareggio di 
bilancio e credibilità della politica fiscale: il ruolo del 
fiscal council nella riforma costituzionale italiana, 20 
January, available at: www.astrid-online.it.
77. According to Paolo De Ioanna (2012), La nuova cor-
nice costituzionale apre nuove dinamiche tra le forze 
politiche e nella cornice delle interpretazioni, econom-
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and organisation have recently been disciplined 
by the re-inforced law no 243/2012 of 24 Decem-
ber 2012; Art. 16 of the law, in particular, provides 
that the Council is made up of three members ap-
pointed upon the basis of common agreements by 
the Chairs of the two Houses within a list of ten 
persons drawn up by competent parliamentary 
committees (upon the basis of agreements ad-
opted by a two-thirds majority) from the experts 
in public finances. From the point of view of the 
Office’s staff and funding,78 the newly-established 
Italian Fiscal Council also reveals itself to be firm-
ly rooted in the parliamentary administration.
iche e giuridiche , dei fenomeni di finanza pubblica, 
Presentation held at the Conference ‘La nuova govern-
ance fiscale europea. Fiscal Compact, cornice euro-
pea e modifiche costituzionali in Italia’ - Rome, Luiss 
Guido Carli, 9 November) the reasons behind the crea-
tion of the Independent Fiscal Body are to be found not 
only in the drives coming from the European Union, 
but also in the increasing unsatisfaction of politicians 
for the low level of transparency of the budgetary and 
fiscal policy-making and in their ambition to partici-
pate in a less critical way to such decisional process. 
See also Daniele Cabras (2012), Un Fiscal Council in 
Parlamento, in http://www.federalismi.it/, 17 October.
78. See, in particular, Articles 17 and 19 of the Law n. 
243/2012.
France has also recently provided for the imple-
mentation of the Fiscal Compact through the Loi 
organique no. 2012-1403 of 17 December 2012 on 
the planning and governance of public finances,79 
which (Art. 11), among other things, disciplines 
the establishment of the High Council of Public 
Finances, an independent body set of by the Cour 
des comptes, chaired by the President of the ac-
counts authority and composed of ten members, 
of which four are judges of the Cour des comptes 
and four are members appointed by the relevant 
representatives of the two Houses.80 The peculiar-
79. Following the Decision of the Conseil constitutionnel 
n. 2012-653 DC of the 9 August 2012 (on which see 
Rino Casella (2012), Il Consiglio costituzionale francese 
e il trattato sul Fiscal compact, 26 October, available at: 
www.forumcostituzionale.it), the French strategy can 
be defined as an example of a ‘minimal’ adaptation to 
the TSCG (on this point, see Henri Sterdyniak (2012), 
Gouvernance des finances publiques: du Pacte budgé-
taire à la loi organique, 15 October, available at: http://
www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/blog/?p=2637), based on the 
recourse not to a constitutional law, but rather on a re-
inforced law, as the loi organique. 
80. Before being formally approved, the French loi or-
ganique was submitted – in compliance with the 
procedure of Articles 46 (5) and 61 (1) of the French 
Constitution – to the Conseil constitutionnel for an as-
sessment of its conformity to the Constitution. With 
the Decision n. 2012-568 of the 13 December 2012, 
ity of the French model is, therefore, due to the 
strong interaction provided not only by the par-
liament but also with the Cour des comptes, thus 
widening the classic dichotomy between govern-
ment-centred and parliament-centred institu-
tions (which had already been affected, but not 
fully overcome, by the hybrid Office for Budget 
Responsibility).81
the Conseil, among others, judged as being unconsti-
tutional the provisions (Articles 11. 1 and 11.3) bind-
ing the appointment of the four judges selected by the 
Cour de comptes and of the single member nominated 
by the President of the Conseil économique, social et 
environnemental to an ‘audition publique par les com-
missions des finances et les commissions des affaires so-
ciales de l’Assemblée nationale et du Sénat’ (par. 39). 
The decision was motivated on the basis of the princi-
ple of the separation of powers. The same procedural 
obligation was instead ‘saved’ by the Conseil in the part 
referred to the appointment of the four members in 
representation of the two Chambers, but the provision 
was judged as not having the legal status of ‘organique’ 
rule (par. 40).
81. On the atypical nature of the French Haut Conseil aux 
finances publiques, which can be assimilated neither 
to the model of parliamentary Fiscal Councils (as the 
Congressional Budget Office in the USA), nor to the 
fiscal agencies derived from the government, see Sam-
uel-Frédéric Servière (2012), Haut Conseil des finances 
publiques: les propositions de la Fondation iFRAP, 13 
September, available at: www.ifrap.org.
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This comparative overview reveals how, in the Eu-
ropean context, it is only the ‘last generation’ Fiscal 
Councils that are envisaged from the structural 
point of view as having a solid and direct relation-
ship with the parliament. A partial justification 
of this general trend can be found in the newly-
emerged need to conform to EU requirements, 
which clearly force the setting up of a more direct 
contact in between the national legislatures and 
the fiscal agencies.
Notwithstanding these formal institutional as-
pects, one could expect the crisis to have encour-
aged the research of a democratic legitimation for 
the mandate of Fiscal Councils based upon the 
development of a direct channel of interaction 
with national parliaments.
5.2 The Relationship ‘Fiscal 
Councils – Parliaments’ 
and its Interaction with 
the Parliamentary Scrutiny 
and Oversight Function on 
the Budgetary and Fiscal 
Matters
A second potential factor which influences the in-
teraction established by the national parliaments 
with Fiscal Councils can be found in the capacity 
of the legislature itself to structure and autono-
mously develop the budgetary and financial scru-
tiny of the activities of their government.
To isolate this factor, it necessary to consider the 
main features of the most relevant models of par-
liamentary budget scrutiny. Given that the par-
liamentary oversight of budgets is mainly carried 
out at committee level,82 it is important to distin-
82. In the budgetary oversight, the availability of a pro-
active and powerful committee becomes strategic for 
assuring a constant parliamentary watch over govern-
mental expenses. Committee involvement in the budg-
et, in fact, tends to favour the prevalence of technical 
engagement over political posturing, while the opposite 
happens when the subject involved is the House, which 
guish between two different types of committee 
expertise in the budget sector. The first type is that 
of specialised budget committees which operate 
during ex ante scrutiny, whose task is mainly that 
of analysing and of approving the governmental 
draft budget. The second type is that of ex post 
scrutiny committees, which finds its most rele-
vant example in the Public Accounts Committees 
(PAC) of the Commonwealth system. The mod-
ern PACs represent specialised audit committees 
which interact closely with the supreme auditor 
and are entitled to scrutinise the governmental 
accounts.
These two types of committee expertise do not al-
ways go hand in hand: as is evidenced by compar-
ative studies,83 the so called ‘Westminster system’, 
rather tends to linger on broad criticism. On this point, 
see Warren Krafchik & Joachim Wehner (2004), Legis-
latures and Budget Oversight: Best Practices, Paper pre-
sented at the Open Forum held in Almaty on 8 April, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050404oversight.
pdf, p. 7 and Joachim Wehner (2006), Legislative insti-
tutions and fiscal policy, in PSPE working papers, n. 08, 
Department of Government, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, London, UK, p. 17 ff.
83. As explained by Joachim Wehner (2005), Legislative 
arrangements for financial scrutiny: Explaining cross-
national variation, in R. Pelizzo, R. Stapenhurst & D. 
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which characterises Commonwealth parliaments, 
represents a combination of low ex ante capacity 
(also due to the absence of the involvement of ex 
ante committees) and a highly-developed ex post 
capacity.84 The opposite occurs in parliaments 
outside the Commonwealth, such as the French 
parliament, where the oversight of the budget is 
carried out by standing committees responsible 
both for the approval of the budget and for the 
scrutiny of its execution.85 The oversight archi-
Olson (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in the Budget 
Process, Washington DC, World Bank Institute, p. 13, 
the differences in the legislatures’ approach to budget 
cycle and budget issues are explained by a number 
of variables, including not only the parliamentary or 
presidential nature of the system of government, but 
also the internal design of parliamentary powers to 
amend the budget, the party political dynamics, the 
legislative budget research capacity, the access to rel-
evant information, and so forth.
84. Edward Davey (2000), Making MPs work for our mon-
ey: reforming Parliament’s role in budget scrutiny, in 
Centre for Reform Paper n. 19, London, Centre for Re-
form.
85. Such committees are endowed with dedicated proce-
dures and parliamentary tools, including the assign-
ment of a specific oversight mission to a rapporteur 
special, the assignment of cross-sectional controls to 
the whole of the rapporteurs speciaux, the development 
of cross-sectional oversight mission, coordinated by 
tecture adopted (either based upon a specialised 
committee or upon legislative committees also 
entitled to perform budgetary scrutiny) does not 
the Chair of the committee and/or by the rapporteur 
general. The Finance committee of the National As-
sembly, in particular, exercises the oversight function 
mainly through the Mission d’évaluation et de controle 
(MEC), whose main task is to interrogate political and 
administrative officials on the management of their 
resources and to inquiry on sectorial public policies, 
using the variety of parliamentary tools disciplined by 
Articles 57, 59 and 60 of the LOLF, including the dis-
patch of questionnaires to government officials, in loco 
controls and hearings. Apart from the scrutiny activity 
carried out in standing committees, the French model 
(as the Italian one) is characterised also by the inter-
vention of the assembly in the budgetary oversight, 
which, through the approval of the loi de règlement, 
is given an important chance of judging governmen-
tal budgetary performances. These two profiles of the 
oversight function occur at different institutional stag-
es: in particular, the committee oversight occupies the 
stage of the budget execution; the assembly control, in-
stead, is limited to the final stage of the budget execu-
tion. For further details, see Paul Amselek (1998), Le 
budget de l’État et le parlement sous la V République, in 
Revue du Droit Publique, n. 5-6, p. 1449; Irène Bouha-
dana (2007), Les commissions des finances des assem-
blées parlementaires en France: origines, évolutions et 
enjeux, Paris, LDGJ, p. 273 ff.; Aurélien Baudu (2010), 
Contribution à l’étude des pouvoirs budgétaires du Par-
lement en France: éclairage historique et perspectives 
d’évolution, Paris, Dalloz. 
seem to influence either the intensity or the de-
gree of the parliamentary scrutiny function: this 
is confirmed by the fact that not only in the UK, 
but also in France, the parliament has eventually 
developed a well-structured scrutiny architecture, 
which enables daily control of the governmental 
budgetary policy. In Belgium,86 Germany,87 and 
86. The Budget and Finance Committee of the Chamber 
of representatives mostly depends on the budgetary 
information and data provided by the government 
for assessing its performances; also in the approval of 
the lois the comptes, which definitely consolidates the 
budget of the previous year, the role of the assembly is 
often limited to a mere ratification of what proposed by 
the government. During the budget execution, this lat-
ter has in fact many possibilities to modify its original 
proposals, adjusting budgetary provisions to incoming 
institutional needs; these variations must be submitted 
to Parliament, which can take the initiative to interro-
gate the government on the budget execution.
87. In Germany the scrutiny of budget execution and 
budgetary management is carried out by the Bunde-
stag mainly basing on the activity of a specific sub-
committee created within the Budget committee and 
known as Auditing committee. The Auditing commit-
tee is closely linked to three independent specialised 
bodies provided by the Federal law (the ‘Financing 
Body’; the ‘Confidential Committee’; the ‘Financial 
Market Body’) and is directly supported by the Fed-
eral Court of Audit. The co-operation with these in-
dependent agencies contributes to fill in some of the 
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Italy,88 too, parliamentary oversight is carried out 
most striking gaps of the ex post scrutiny activity of the 
budget committee: also due to the absence of dedicated 
budgetary oversight tools, the committee, in fact, does 
not get involved in the review of the economic assump-
tions used by the government in the budget drafting 
and does not extend its intervention to the scrutiny 
of specific government programs. See M. Schatten-
mann (2009), The Secretariat of the Budget Committee 
of the German Bundestag, Prepared for the Meeting of 
OECD Parliamentary Budget Officials – Rome, 26-27 
February, available at: http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/52/28/42466837.pdf. 
88. The intervention of the parliament in the budgetary 
and fiscal policy-making has not fully evolved yet 
from its original focus on the governmental expenses’ 
authorisation perspective (see Elisabetta De Giorgi 
& Luca Verzichelli (2008), Still a Difficult Budgetary 
Process? The Government, the Legislature and the Fi-
nance Bill, in South European Society & Politics, vol. 
13, n. 1, p. 87 ff.), which found in the ‘dualistic’ scheme 
of the Financial law its main expression (see Andrea 
Manzella (2003), Il Parlamento, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
p. 344). This fact, in its turn, has inhibited the de-
velopment of a ‘real’ model of budgetary and fiscal 
oversight, which is only one symptom of the general 
unsatisfactory development of the control function in 
the Italian parliamentary tradition (see Andrea Man-
zella (2001), La funzione di controllo, in Associazione 
italiana dei costituzionalisti, Annuario 2000. Il Parla-
mento, Atti del XV Convegno annuale, Firenze, 12-13-
14 October 2000, Padova, Cedam, p. 213). The lack of 
a mature approach to budgetary and fiscal oversight 
by hybrid committees involved both in the ex ante 
is confirmed by the absence of dedicated budgetary 
scrutiny tools, at least for what concerns the budget 
execution stage: the control carried out at this stage, 
in fact, is developed by parliamentary bodies and par-
liamentarians through the ordinary and generic con-
trol tools and procedures disciplined by the two Rules 
of procedure. The only ‘typical’ budgetary oversight 
tool is represented by the assembly’s approval (in line 
with the French experience) of the rendiconto, which 
nevertheless in the Italian experience has never given 
the legislature the opportunity of an effective control 
of budgetary trends; in any case, such a control tool 
invests the final stage of budget execution (Carlo Chi-
appinelli (2009), La evoluzione del sistema dei controlli 
e la relazione sul rendiconto generale dello Stato, in Riv-
ista della Corte dei conti, n. 2, p. 256 ff.). On the most 
recent attempts to invert the relationship between the 
ex ante and the ex post budgetary scrutiny function by 
limiting the content of the financial law as to reduce 
the parliamentary bargaining on the governmental 
proposals, see Guido Rivosecchi (2007), I poteri ispet-
tivi e il controllo parlamentare dal question time alle 
Commissioni di inchiesta, in E. Gianfrancesco & N. 
Lupo (eds.), Le regole del diritto parlamentare nella di-
alettica tra maggioranza e opposizione, Roma, LUP, p. 
181; Nicola Lupo (2009), Le sessioni di bilancio, ieri e 
oggi, in G.. Carboni (ed.), La funzione finanziaria del 
Parlamento. Un confronto tra Italia e Gran Bretagna, 
Torino, Giappichelli, p. 36 ff.; Daniele Cabras (2010), 
I poteri di informazione e controllo del Parlamento in 
materia di contabilità e finanza pubblica alla luce della 
legge 31 dicembre 2009, n. 196, 30 April, available at: 
www.forumcostituzionale.it; Chiara Goretti & Luca 
stage and in the ex post scrutiny; however, these 
three parliamentary experiences have not yet de-
veloped specific budgetary-scrutiny tools and 
procedures. Probably as a result of this, the degree 
of the national parliament’s involvement in the 
oversight of budget execution remains weak.89
Once the different features of the parliamentary 
oversight models have been clarified, it is possible 
to consider the basic characteristics of the interac-
tion between the national legislature and the fiscal 
agency, by focusing on the functional profiles of 
this relationship, analysed according to the crite-
ria presented in Section 2.
Rizzuto (2011), Il ruolo del Parlamento italiano nella 
decisione di bilancio: evoluzione recente e confronto con 
gli altri paesi, in Rivista di politica economica, n. 1-3, p. 
51-52.
89. For a detailed comparison among the main models 
of parliamentary budgetary oversight and on their 
impact in terms of the intensity of the parliamentary 
scrutiny function, see Elena Griglio (2012), Parliamen-
tary oversight of national budgets. Recent trends in EU 
Member States, Paper presented at the Tenth Work-
shop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, 
cit.
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5.2.1 The German and Belgian 
Experiences as Two Examples 
of Weak Interaction between 
the Fiscal Councils and the 
Parliaments
In Germany and Belgium, the co-operation be-
tween the existing Fiscal Councils – classified, in 
Section 5.1., within the more general category of 
government-oriented agencies – and the legisla-
tive branch reveals itself to be extremely weak.
With regard to what concerns the German Coun-
cil for Economic Experts, the main duty of this 
body consists of compiling and publishing an 
Annual Economic Report which is submitted to 
the Federal government by 15 of November every 
year.90 Apart from the Annual Report, the Coun-
90. According to Article 2 of the Appointment Act, in fact, 
in the Annual Report the Council of Experts draws the 
fundamental features of the current economic situa-
tion, pointing out its foreseeable developments and the 
possibility of avoiding or suppressing such develop-
ments, without, however, recommending any specific 
measures of economic and social policy. Each member 
of the Council is assured full autonomy in the prepara-
tion of the Report: according to Article 3 of the Ap-
pointment Act, in fact, if a minority differs on specific 
cil also prepares ad hoc special reports, depending 
on the mandate issued by the government, which 
usually refer to specific current problems.
The strictly advisory nature of the Council’s du-
ties, together with the narrowness of the formal 
powers attributed to it, are in line with the funda-
mental feature which characterises the Council’s 
interaction with other institutional bodies, i.e., 
its dependence on the government. The Council 
does not seem to develop direct contacts with the 
Bundestag, as most of this interaction is mediated 
by the intervention of the government.91 This im-
plies that the relationship between the Council of 
economic experts and the parliament is not a di-
rect one, but is, instead, one which is constantly 
arbitrated (both from the procedural and from the 
substantial point of view) by the government.
questions, it has the right to express its disagreement 
in the Report.
91. Article 6 of the Appointment Act provides that the 
Annual Report is promptly submitted by the Federal 
Government to the legislative bodies and is published 
by the Council at the same time. Within eight weeks 
the Federal Government presents its comments on the 
report to the legislative bodies. In this statement, the 
Federal Government presents the conclusions to which 
it has come with regard to economy policy.
The filtering role of the Federal government in 
the interaction between the Council of economic 
experts and the Federal parliament is to be found 
first of all in the presentation of the Annual Eco-
nomic Report, drafted by the Federal government 
itself92 to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, every 
January.
From the point of view of the funding, the Coun-
cil is endowed with financial autonomy, and its 
remuneration and expenses are borne directly by 
the Federal government.93
92. The governmental Report, which among other things 
describes the government’s economic and financial 
goals for the year as well as the fundamentals of its 
economic and financial policy, in its Part I includes 
detailed comments on the Annual Report of the Ger-
man Council of Economic Experts. The reference to 
the Council’s Report is formally provided by Article 2 
of the West German Law to Promote Economic Stabil-
ity and Growth, dated 8 June 1967.
93. In particular, according to Article 11 of the Appoint-
ment Act, the amount of the remuneration to be paid 
is determined jointly by the Federal Minister of Eco-
nomics and Technology and the Federal Minister of 
the Interior. No intervention of the Federal parliament, 
in line with the ‘governmental’ nature of the body, is 
therefore provided by law in this relevant aspect of the 
Council’s institutional profile.
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Finally, the fact that the Council of economic ex-
perts is strongly centred on the executive branch 
influences the accountability rules, which make 
the Council responsible only to the government. 
The Appointment Act, also considered in its ap-
plication over the decades, clearly gives the idea 
that the role of political advisor prevails over that 
of scientific advisor; this consideration has raised 
some criticism in the literature, supporting the 
idea of the Council of economic experts being 
seen as a ‘parallel government’.94
In conclusion, the German Council for Economic 
Experts can be considered as a typical example 
of a ‘governmental’ Fiscal Council, which reveals 
only weak and indirect ties with the parliament; 
the possibility of the Council playing a strategic 
informative and advisory role with regard to the 
94. Uwe Andersen & Wichard Woyke (eds.) (2003), Sach-
verständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung, in Handwörterbuch des 
politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
5., aktual. Aufl. Opladen: Leske+Budrich 2003. Li-
zenzausgabe Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bil-




parliament reveals itself to be quite weak, due to 
the constant intermediation of the government 
in the relationship between the Council and the 
legislative branch. The narrowness of the tasks at-
tributed to the Council, which mainly exercises 
an advisory function on matters of economic and 
fiscal policies, is also attributed to the fact that the 
origin of this body dates back to a period in which 
the institutional space now recognised to the Fis-
cal Council was still lacking.
In Belgium, too, the government-centred nature 
of the NAI and of the High Council of Finance 
also reflects itself in the rules concerning the over-
all functioning of these two fiscal bodies.
Both Councils intervene in the fiscal and budget-
ary policy-making,95 but the National Audit Of-
95. The process starts in May when medium and long-term 
projections are presented by the government, followed, 
in June and July respectively by the recommendations 
of the High Council of Finance and by the release of 
provisional short-term macroeconomic forecasting 
exercised by the National Audit Office (adjourned in 
September). The federal budget is submitted to the Par-
liament in October; after the presentation of the new 
budget, an updated version of the Stability Programme 
is made public. The process ends in February, with the 
reassessment of the economic budget, and then in 
fice intervenes mainly in the ex ante stage, while 
the contribution of the High Council of Finance 
is focused both on the ex ante and on the ex post 
stage. In particular, the intervention of the NAI in 
the budgetary process is mainly due to the activ-
ity of the Federal Bureau for Planning,96 whose 
most relevant task relates to the production of the 
macroeconomic forecasts upon which the bud-
get drafted by the Federal government is based;97 
however, the legislative chambers may also apply 
to the Bureau in order to assess policy measures 
March, with the control of budget execution. See Igor 
Lebrun (2007), Fiscal councils, independent forecasts 
and the budgetary process, cit., p. 342 and 354.
96. For further details, see Aude Rousselot (2006), Pré-
sentation du Centraal Planbureau néerlandais et du 
Bureau fédéral du Plan belge, Actualités du WRR néer-
landais et de la Strategy Unit britannique, in Horizons 
stratégiques, n. 2 p. 122 ff.
97. The Bureau, moreover, releases the medium-term eco-
nomic outlook for the Belgian economy used by the 
government in order to elaborate the stability pro-
gramme. The government does not seem to have a 
formal duty to take into account the Bureau’s forecasts 
in the drafting of the budget; however, up to this mo-
ment, this is usually happened: a striking dissociation 
from the NAI’s forecasts would in fact determine a loss 
of credibility for the government.
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(which, however, can never end in policy recom-
mendations).
The intervention of the High Council of Finance 
in the budgetary policy-making, in contrast, is 
bound to the publication of two annual reports 
(drafted by the Council’s ‘Public-sector borrowing 
requirement’ section);98 the first report refers to 
the ex post stage, the second to the ex ante stage.99
98. For further details, see Paul Bernd Spahn (2007), In-
tergovernmental Fiscal Relations, and Structural Prob-
lems of Federalism in Belgium, Washington DC, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, par. 56 ff., available at: www.
wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de.
99. The first report, released around March, presents a 
general assessment of past and present budgetary poli-
cies, in particular those implementing the budget and 
the stability programme; such report can be at times 
quite critical. The second report, presented in June/
July, analyses the borrowing requirements of each gov-
ernment and makes recommendations concerning the 
respect both of short, medium and long-term fiscal tar-
gets and of budget balances (for general government, 
its sub-sectors and federated entities). The distinction 
between the two reports (and therefore between the 
intervention in the ex ante and in the ex post stage) re-
veals itself a bit blurred, also due to the fact that some 
changes in the timing of the stability programme have 
recently occurred.
The funding of the two bodies confirms their ex-
clusive dependence on a decision of the govern-
ment. In compliance with Article 118 of the Law 
of 21 December 1994, the NAI is financed by an 
annual grant from the Federation, to be included 
within the budget section of the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs.100 With regard to the High Council 
of Finance, according to Article 13 of the Arrêté 
royal of the 3 April 2006, the agency’s internal fi-
nancial regulation (which can provide for the al-
location of allowances and other forms of remu-
neration to the members of the Council, to staff 
members and to external advisors) is approved by 
the Ministry of Finances.
On the accountability side, the government-cen-
tred nature of the two institutions does not pre-
vent them from enjoying full independence: both 
agencies, as public institutions, have ministers 
overseeing their activities and budgets, but, at the 
same time, mainly due to the specific nature of 
their tasks, they can also act on their own initia-
tive.
100. The secretariat of the Institute is covered by the official 
of the Ministry for economic affairs, in co-operation 
with the services of the National Bank of Belgium.
In conclusion, the twofold Belgian model of Fiscal 
Councils is characterised by its proximity to the 
executive branches at both national and regional 
level, which, however, has not prevented the two 
bodies from consolidating their independence. 
The impact of the two Councils on fiscal and 
budgetary policies is not, in fact, very formalised 
or transparent, and it seems to have waned after 
adoption of the euro, becoming more and more 
independent from government plans, also thanks 
to the growing interaction with the Federated En-
tities and to the increased budget co-ordination 
between the Federal government and the Regional 
governments.101
101. See Paul Van Rompuy (2008), La coordination des poli-
tiques budgétaires en Belgique: 15 ans d’expeérience du 
Conseil supérieur des Finances, in M. Mignolet (ed.), Le 
fédéralisme fiscal. Leçons de la théorie économique et 
expérience de 4 États fédéraux, Brussels, De Boeck Uni-
versité, n. 4, p. 33 ff. and Luc Coene & Geert Langenus 
(2011), Promoting fiscal discipline in a federal country: 
the mixed track record of Belgium’s High Council of 
Finance, Presentation held at the Conference on ‘Fis-
cal Policy Councils: Why do we need them and what 
makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 January 2011, availa-
ble at: http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at/de/img/
s23_langenus_tcm163-221976.pdf.
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The structural ties developed by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility with both the government 
and the parliament are confirmed by the func-
tional links established by the Office with both 
branches.
In particular, with regard to the relationship with 
the legislative branch, the Office has shown a clear 
aptitude for serving as a source of information and 
analytical studies to parliamentary committees.102
The tasks attributed to the Office involve the agen-
cy in a general surveillance of public finances and 
budgetary policies; the nature of such activities 
implies that the government is constantly under 
the Councils’ oversight, which, in its turn, can 
serve the parliament with some relevant elements 
102. According to Section 8 (2) b) of the Act and to Section 
16 (6) of Schedule 1 of the Act, in fact, every report 
prepared by the Office in pursuance of its duties must 
be laid before Parliament.
for political judgment. The Office has four main 
tasks: to produce forecasts for the economy and 
public finances; to judge the progress towards the 
government’s fiscal targets; to assess the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances; and to scru-
tinise the Treasury’s costing of budget measures. 
Each of these tasks is associated with specific pub-
lications which are made available to the parlia-
ment.103
103. For instance, the Economic and Fiscal Outlook publica-
tion is produced twice a year by the Office and it in-
corporates both the five-year forecasts for the economy 
and public finances and the assessment of the govern-
ment’s progresses towards medium-term fiscal targets; 
the spring Economic and Fiscal Outlook publication 
incorporates the impact of tax and spending policy 
measures announced in the Budget Bill. Moreover, the 
Fiscal sustainability report, produced once a year, is 
meant to evaluate, for each category of spending and 
revenue, the long-term sustainability of the public fi-
nances. Finally, in the Treasury’s costing documents, 
the Office scrutinises Treasury’s costing of budget 
measures in order to test whether costing proposed 
by the government in the Treasury documents corre-
sponds to reasonable estimates. See Office for Budget 
Responsibility, Fiscal Sustainability Report, published 
on 13 July 2011 and available at: http://budgetresponsi-
bility.independent.gov.uk/fiscal-sustainability-report-
july-2011.
Moreover, the agency is actively involved in par-
liamentary works as it has to answer parliamen-
tary questions (especially those concerning its 
forecasts) and has to give evidence to parliamen-
tary committees (mainly with the Treasury Select 
Committee and linked to the reports produced by 
the Office in the exercise of its scrutiny function) 
through committee hearings. From the point of 
view of the funding, the agency interacts both 
with the Treasury and with the parliament.104
Finally, the Office’s collective accountability105 is 
assessed through two different types of control: 
the ‘institutional’ control made by both the Trea-
sury and the parliament upon the basis of the 
Annual Report of the performance of the Office’s 
104. See Sections 17 and 18 of Schedule 1 of the Act.
105. An individual accountability applicable to each Of-
fice member is moreover provided by Section 6 of the 
Schedule 1 of the Budget Responsibility and National 
Audit Act, which in particular disciplines the termi-
nation of appointment made by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in case of malpractice or misconduct of the 
appointee. Even if the law determines the cases justi-
fying the anticipated termination of mandate, accord-
ing to Section 6 (3) of Schedule 1 of the Act, the ap-
pointment of an Office member is not to be terminated 
without the consent of the Treasury Committee of the 
House of Commons.
5.2.2 The Office for Budget 
Responsibility: a Fiscal 
Councils which Interacts both 
with the Government and with 
the Parliament
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tasks drafted in each financial year (Section 15 of 
the Schedule 1 of the Act); and the ‘external’ re-
view exercised by the person or body appointed, 
at least once in every relevant five-year period, by 
the non-executive Committee in compliance with 
Section 16 of Schedule 1 of the Act and entrusted 
to review reports made in pursuance of the Of-
fice’s duty.
In conclusion, the main features of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility can be found in the mixed 
nature of the agency (governmental and parlia-
mentary) which, associated with a consolidated 
tradition of parliamentary oversight of budget-
ary and fiscal policies, enables the establishment 
of close interaction and co-operation between the 
parliament and the fiscal institution.
5.2.3 Towards the Development of 
New Models of Interaction 
between Fiscal Councils 
and Parliaments: The Recent 
Italian and French Reforms
If, up until the latest national reforms, the only 
European case of a parliament-centred fiscal 
agency was represented by the Hungarian Fiscal 
Council,106 the new independent bodies created 
106. The Hungarian Fiscal Council was created in 2009 
under the Act LXXV of 2008 on Cost-efficient State 
Management and Fiscal Responsibility. A detailed 
analysis of the background which accompanied the in-
stitution of the Hungarian Fiscal Council, of its func-
tions and basic modus operandi is offered by George 
Kopits (2011), Independent Fiscal Institutions: Develop-
ing Good Practices, Presentation prepared for the 3rd 
Annual Meeting of OECD Parliamentary Budget Of-
ficials, Stockholm - Sweden, 28-29 April, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgetingandpub-
licexpenditures/48089510.pdf. Especially after the ap-
proval of Act CXCIV of 2011 on the Economic Stability 
of Hungary, which assigned new tasks to the Council, 
the body has developed a strong and direct relation-
ship with the General Assembly which emerges in 
particular in the parliamentary proceeding for the ap-
proval of the Act of the Central Budget: according to 
Art. 24 (3), in submitting the draft Act to the National 
Assembly, the government must follow the receipt of 
the comments of the Council; if the Council has com-
municated its disagreement by the deadline,  the gov-
ernment shall again discuss the draft and submit the 
same to the National Assembly afterwards. For a con-
crete example of how the Council exercises this func-
tion, see the opinion of the Fiscal Council ‘on the major 
characteristics of the budgetary and economic processes 
of Hungary in the period of January-September, 2012’, 
adopted by the Resolution 11/2012.10.29. of the Fiscal 
Council of Hungary KVT-67/2012.
in Italy and France seem to add some significant 
novelties to this comparative framework.
The recent approval of such reforms does not en-
able us to deepen the functional profiles of the 
relationship with the legislative branch (also due 
to the fact that the two bodies have not yet been 
installed). However, upon the basis of regulatory 
norms, it is possible to develop some reflections 
on their future interaction with legislative assem-
blies.
With regard to the Italian experience, it is impor-
tant to underline that the parliamentary nature 
of the upcoming fiscal institution (created, as 
already mentioned in Section 5.1.3, ‘by’ the two 
Chambers) implicitly seems to encourage the 
parliament to develop strong bicameral synergies 
in the development of parliamentary budgetary 
oversight. Article 5, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tional Law n. 1/2012, clearly states that the two 
Chambers, in compliance with their own rules of 
procedure, must exercise the oversight function 
on the public finance, with specific regard to the 
balance between expenditure and revenue, and to 
the quality and effectiveness of the spending of the 
public administration. If this provision apparently 
297The Euro Crisis & the State of European Democracy
Go to Contents
seems to enable the two Chambers to operate in-
dependently in the exercise of the oversight func-
tion, the presence of an internal office devoted to 
the analysis of the economic and financial data 
and trends will not be neutral for the strengthen-
ing of the overall involvement of the parliament in 
the budgetary and financial oversight.
This instrumental body will therefore serve as a 
research unit for the whole parliament, thus fa-
vouring the budgetary and fiscal specialisation of 
the latter in the exercise not only of the ex post 
scrutiny, but possibly also of the ex ante scrutiny. 
For these reasons, the well-functioning of such an 
organism will be crucial in order to ensure the ef-
fective respect of the new principle of the parlia-
mentary responsibility on the financial and bud-
getary control, introduced by Article 5, Section 4 
of Constitutional Law no. 1/2012.107 In the long-
term, as correctly observed,108 budgetary control 
107. On the prospective implementation of Article 5 of 
Constitutional Law no. 1/2012, see Giustino Lo Conte 
(2012), L’organismo indipendente di monitoraggio della 
finanza pubblica, in Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 
n. 10, p. 939 ff.
108. Raffaele Perna (2008), Le procedure di bilancio, fra Go-
verno e Parlamento, in una democrazia maggioritaria, 
in Il Filangieri, Quaderno 2007, Il Parlamento del bi-
based exclusively upon the voluntary behaviour 
of parliamentary bodies and actors does not seem 
able to offer structural solutions, given the institu-
tional call for empowered budgetary information 
to be available to the parliaments.
It is not easy to predict whether such an organism 
will have a decisive role in the improvement of the 
fiscal and budgetary governance, and, in particu-
lar, if it will contribute to shift the influence of the 
parliament from the budgetary decision-making 
stage to the ex ante and ex post stages. The lack of a 
solid tradition of co-operation between the parlia-
ment and the government both before the budget 
is approved and during its execution could, in fact, 
either compromise the success of the upcoming 
fiscal institution or make it strategic for assuring 
better governance for the whole sector.
Finally, the recent French reform introduced with 
the loi organique relative à la programmation et 
à la gouvernance des finances publiques created 
the Haut Conseil des finances publiques as an ad-
visory body endowed with strong independence 
from the fiscal authorities, but, at the same time, 
cameralismo. Un decennio di riforme dei regolamenti 
delle Camere, 2008, p. 175.
established its stable and prompt intervention at 
all the relevant stages of the budgetary and finan-
cial decision-making. In particular, the Council 
is required to formulate its advice on the govern-
mental macroeconomic and financial forecasting 
upon which the annual law for the public financ-
es planning (loi de programmation des finances 
publiques) and the annual financial law (loi des 
finances)109 are based. This advisory activity – 
formally disciplined as an autonomous function 
– will undoubtedly contribute to offer the parlia-
ment a strengthened technical informative basis 
and analytical capacity which will prove particu-
larly useful for the re-inforcement of parliamen-
tary ex ante scrutiny.
The possibility for parliamentary bodies to estab-
lish direct interaction with the Council is, more-
over, explicitly recognised by Article 20 of the loi 
organique n. 2012-1403, which provides that the 
Chair of the Haut Conseil must be heard at any 
time upon the request of the committees of the 
National Assembly and of the Senate.110
109. See Articles 12-17 of the loi organique n. 2012-1403.
110. The Decision n. 2012-568 of 13 December 2012 of the 
Conseil constitutionnel determined that the provision 
of Article 20 does not violate the Constitution, but at 
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Upon the basis of such premises, the likelihood 
that the Haut Conseil des Finances will operate 
as a functional interface for the parliament can 
be considered as a continuation of the more gen-
eral trend directed towards a re-inforcement of 
the parliamentary involvement in the budgetary 
decision-making process.111 This trend, launched 
by the approval of the Loi organique relative aux 
loi de finances in 2001, contributed to a significant 
renewal of the parliamentary scrutiny of the bud-
get, characterised not only by the strengthening 
of parliamentary dedicated oversight tools,112 but 
the same time does not share the legal status of ‘orga-
nique’ rule (par. 59)
111. For an overview of this trend, see Aurélien Baudu 
(2010), L’incertaine renaissance parlementaire en ma-
tière budgétaire et financière, in Revue du droit public et 
de la science politique en France et à l’étranger, n. 5, p. 
1423 ff.; Pauline Türk (2011), Le contrôle parlementaire 
en France, Paris, LGDJ, p. 176 ff. 
112. In particular, the 2009 French modification of the 
National Assembly Rules of procedure (adopted af-
ter the Constitutional reform of 2008) which created 
the Comité d’èvaluation et de contrôle, as well as the 
Petit loi approved by the French Parliament on 13 July 
2011 (which introduced the ‘Lois cadre’ on the balance 
of public finances), can be interpreted as an attempt 
to favour a more structural control of the parliament 
on the budgetary and financial assets, anticipating the 
also by the promotion of a new partnership with 
the court of auditors.113 In this sense, the devel-
opment of a constructive interaction between the 
independent body and the two representative as-
semblies can be said to be favoured by the long-
established co-operation which, in the French tra-
dition, has marked the relationship between the 
Cour des comptes and the parliament.114
budget bill. See Jean Arthuis Le Seuil (2010), La dégra-
dation des finances publiques: la loi en échec, le contrôle 
et l’évaluation en recours, in Pouvoirs, n. 3, p. 83 ff. and 
Laurence Baghestani (2011), A propos de la loi tendant 
à renforcer les moyens du Parlement en matière de 
contrôle de l’action du Gouvernement et d’évaluation 
des politiques publique, in Les Petites affiches, La Loi, 
Le Quotidien juridique, n. 78, April, p. 3).
113. On this point, see Alain Lambert (2010), Vers un mo-
dèle français de contrôle budgétaire, in Pouvoirs, n. 134, 
p. 47-48.
114. On the origins of this inter-institutional co-operation, 
see Guy Carcassonne (1997), Les relations de la Cour 
et du Parlement: ambuiguïtés et difficultés, in Revue 
français de finances publiques, n. 59, p. 131 ff. On the 
effects of the most recent reforms on the interaction 
between the parliament and the Cour des Comptes, see 
Michel-Piere Prat and Cyril Janvier (2010), La Cour 
des comptes, auxiliaire de la démocratie, in Pouvoirs, n. 
134, p. 97 ff., which defines the French Supreme Audit 
Authority an ‘auxiliaire de la démocratie’. 
The comparative overview presented in this sec-
tion has revealed that the variety of parliamentary 
models of budgetary scrutiny is likewise accom-
panied by a variety of patterns of interaction be-
tween the fiscal institution and the representative 
assemblies. The combination of these two factors 
does not always offer conclusive data on the exis-
tence of a direct relationship between the intensity 
of the parliamentary involvement in the budgetary 
scrutiny and the establishment of close co-opera-
tion with the fiscal agency. However, the British 
case confirms that, where parliament has matured 
a consolidated praxis in the scrutiny of the budget, 
interaction with the fiscal agency tends to evolve 
spontaneously. In other words, well-established 
parliamentary scrutiny will undoubtedly encour-
age such inter-institutional co-operation. But the 
existence of unstable parliamentary oversight of 
the budget does not preclude the fulfilment of 
this purpose; in this perspective, the Italian case 
will be strategic in proving the opposite thesis, 
confirming how a weak parliament (in the ex post 
scrutiny stage) can take advantage of the creation 
of a fiscal agency in the development of its over-
sight function.
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6. Conclusions: The Setting-up of Fiscal 
Councils and its Implications on the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny in the new 
European Economic Governance
The current crisis, which the European Union 
Member States are also facing, has been regarded 
as both a financial and a democratic crisis at the 
same time.115 It is primarily a crisis of the cred-
ibility and of the accountability of political institu-
tions, and, in particular, of fiscal authorities for not 
having been able to comply with the basic stan-
dards of sound public accounts in a responsible 
way. Fiscal Councils are one of the tools provided 
by the European Union to counteract the present 
degeneration and to maintain fiscal responsibility 
in the long term.
Directive 2011/85/EU, the TSCG, the Com-
munication from the Commission defining the 
common principles on national fiscal correction 
mechanisms (COM 2012) 342) and the draft reg-
115. See Miguel Poiares Maduro (2012), A New Governance 
for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and 
Justice, cit., p. 3 ff.
ulation on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans (COM (2011) 
821) represent the legal basis for national, albeit 
European-oriented, Fiscal Councils, which now 
have to be established in every Member State. The 
setting up of Fiscal Councils, however, not only 
poses challenges to national institutions, but also 
offers remarkable opportunities, particularly for 
national parliaments.
Amongst the challenges to address, there is, for in-
stance, the relationship between the Fiscal Coun-
cils and the existing institutions, both at national 
and at European level. For example, especially 
in the light of the Commission Communication 
which entitles the Fiscal Councils to perform 
even the ex post assessment, the powers of Fiscal 
Councils could clash with the existing preroga-
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tives of Courts of Auditors, where established.116 
Moreover, according to some scholars, a clear 
link could be established between Fiscal Councils 
and Constitutional Courts, for instance, in Ger-
many, after the adoption of the new national fiscal 
rules.117 In addition, the relationship between the 
Fiscal Councils and the European Commission, 
both acting as ‘fiscal watchdogs’, albeit at different 
levels of government, or the role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in evaluating the 
correct establishment of Fiscal Councils at nation-
al level, continue to remain unclear.
Another challenge derives from the difficulty of 
adapting the existing national Fiscal Councils, 
such as those examined in Section 5.2.1, to the re-
116. On the need to accommodate the activity of the new 
Fiscal Councils with existing institutions, especial-
ly the Court of Auditors, see Daria Perrotta (2012), Il 
rafforzamento della vigilanza sui conti pubblici e l’evo-
luzione della fisionomia delle istituzioni fiscali indipen-
denti, in Le autonomie in cammino. Scritti dedicati a 
G.C. De Martin, Padova, Cedam, p. 539-540.
117. According to Daniele Franco (2011), Comments on ‘The 
Role of Fiscal Policy Councils in Theory’, cit., ‘the new 
German fiscal rule implicitly defines a clear mandate 
for a possible German independent Fiscal Council: to 
provide the economic analysis on which the constitu-
tional court can deliver its judgments.’
quirements established at European Union level. 
The notion of ‘functional autonomy’ or ‘indepen-
dence’ is likely to be ‘filtered’ by the national con-
stitutional tradition (again, the German case is 
particularly telling). In particular, the powers and 
the issue of the inter-institutional accountability 
of Fiscal Councils require some significant adap-
tations in the Member States. For instance, the 
Commission Communication assigns the Fiscal 
Councils with the power to issue policy recom-
mendations towards the national fiscal authority, 
which, in principle, is bound by them and has to 
justify publicly any deviation from the path laid 
down by the Fiscal Council. However, this power 
is provided in a minority of the existing Fiscal 
Councils in the European Union and is likely to 
produce significant effects in terms of the inter-
institutional balance, thereby aiming at limiting 
the discretion of the fiscal authority, especially of 
the executive.
By contrast, perhaps the institution that will ben-
efit most from the establishment of a Fiscal Coun-
cil will be the parliament. Since both the Commu-
nication and the draft regulation state that Fiscal 
Councils are accountable to parliaments, the na-
tional solutions, like that of Germany, in which 
the Fiscal Council does not enjoy direct contact 
with the parliament can be problematical and will 
probably require some reforms.
The enhancement of the relationship between the 
parliaments and the Fiscal Councils would seem to 
be particularly coherent with the approach taken 
by the German Constitutional Court in preserv-
ing the role of the parliament when dealing with 
European Union affairs and budgetary matters, as 
well as with the general framework provided by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, the special relation-
ship enjoyed by the parliaments and the Fiscal 
Councils, according to the Communication and 
the draft regulation, seems also to reconcile the 
problematical disconnection between the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which places national parliaments at 
the centre of representative democracy in Europe 
and lets them participate directly in the European 
decision-making process, and the new European 
economic governance that only marginally or in-
directly considers the national parliaments. The 
suspect ‘new marginalisation’ of the national par-
liaments, which the European measures adopted 
in the aftermath of the reform of the economic 
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governance framework are likely to produce – 
for example, the time-constraints imposed by the 
European semester and the European-driven bal-
anced-budget clauses introduced at constitutional 
level – could be, at least partially, hindered by the 
setting up of Fiscal Councils which have strong 
ties with their legislatures.118 Providing indepen-
dent information, Fiscal Councils can improve 
the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny and 
oversight as well as the quality of the parliamen-
tary output. In other words, thanks to the ‘alliance’ 
with Fiscal Councils, the position of parliaments 
towards the executives will be enhanced in the 
control on budgetary and fiscal matters at national 
level within the European Semester and within the 
procedures for the surveillance of the compliance 
with the medium-term objectives. Therefore, the 
mandatory creation of Fiscal Councils could pos-
sibly induce a further Europeanisation of national 
parliaments, which would reproduce the tradi-
tional tension between the emulation of the most 
118. If, as pointed out by Philip Norton (2010), La nature 
du contrôle parlamentaire, cit., p. 6, the perception of 
a possible ‘decline’ of parliaments conceals the multi-
functional nature of legislative assemblies, such multi-
tasking  parliamentary identity can take great advan-
tage from the co-operation with the Fiscal Councils.
developed national experiences of Fiscal Councils 
(for example, the UK Office for Budget Responsi-
bility) and differentiation. Indeed, differentiation 
reflects, on the one hand, the specificities of the 
institutional landscape of each Member State, its 
form of government, its political and economic 
culture, and the features of parliamentary over-
sight on budgetary matters; on the other, it is the 
result of the differentiated integration of Member 
States in the Economic and Monetary Union and 
of the diverse impact of the Euro crisis across the 
countries.
The development of a solid relationship between 
the parliaments and the Fiscal Councils does not 
seem to impair the respect of the independence of 
Fiscal Councils, as a basic pre-requisite for their 
effective performance. Notwithstanding the ex-
isting differences in the classification of the Fis-
cal Councils and in the interpretation of their role 
with regard to fiscal and budgetary policy-mak-
ing, the literature has usually shared the idea that 
the main threat affecting the role of Fiscal Coun-
cils is to be found in the difficult equilibrium ‘be-
tween Scylla and Charibdis’,119 i.e., between acting 
119. Luc Coene & Geert Langenus (2011), Promoting fiscal 
in full independence (and political irrelevance) 
and merely legitimising government plans. An 
ideal Fiscal Council is expected to steer a middle 
course.
These remarks explain why this paper adopts, 
as a starting-point, the idea that Fiscal Councils 
should be granted full independence from their 
governments, but not necessarily from their par-
liaments. The creation of co-operative patterns 
with the legislative branch represents a valuable 
target both from the point of view of the Fiscal 
Council (which is thus strengthened in its in-
stitutional role and can consolidate its capacity 
to interact with all political parties without be-
coming partisan), and from the point of view of 
the parliament itself (which can thus gain new 
sources of information and analytical data which 
will enable effective control of the activity of the 
government).120 Strengthening the relationship 
discipline in a federal country, cit., p. 20.
120. On ‘the value that an independent budget capacity 
located in the legislature can have for expanding the 
legislature’s role in budgeting and for holding the ex-
ecutive accountable’, see Barry Anderson (2009), The 
changing role of Parliament in the budget process, in 
OECD Journal on Budgeting, vol.1, p. 3.
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with the parliament would, therefore, offer the 
Fiscal Councils the opportunity to be impartial 
without staying outside the political arena: if fiscal 
institutions ‘must work at the core of the demo-
cratic process and be fully owned’,121 the relation-
ship with the parliament reveals itself to be a stra-
tegic one. Such a perspective – consisting in the 
promotion of procedures of direct interaction in 
between Fiscal Councils and their respective rep-
resentative assemblies – constitutes a challenge, 
above all, for those Fiscal Councils which are 
loosely tied to respective parliaments.
The development of this idea has required us to 
widen our original plan of analysis, involving - in 
the comparative survey - a confrontation based 
not only upon the identity and role of the Fiscal 
Councils, but also upon their relationship with 
121. Daniele Franco (2011), Comments on ‘The Role of Fis-
cal Policy Councils in Theory’, cit.; Xavier Debrun 
(2011), The Theory of Independent Fiscal Agencies: 
What Do We Have? What Do We Need? And Where 
Does This Leave Us, Presentation held at the Confer-
ence on ‘Fiscal Policy Councils: Why do we need them 
and what makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 January 
2011, available at: http://www.staatsschuldenauss-
chuss.at/en/img/s16_debrun_tcm164-221973.pdf.
the parliament, which is considered as a part of 
the budgetary and fiscal policy-making.
Interfacing these perspectives of analysis has en-
abled the traditional distinction between ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘parliament’-centred Fiscal Councils to 
be enriched. The comparative survey has revealed 
that the relationship between these two bodies is 
sometimes entirely mediated by the government 
(as the case of Germany clearly reveals); in other 
contexts (the experience of Belgium is emblematic 
at this regard), the parliament is not considered as 
a due interlocutor for the fiscal authorities, whose 
main institutional reference is instead represented 
by the executive branches, at national or at re-
gional level; the British Office for Budget Respon-
sibility offers a good example of a Fiscal Council 
which, although closely-linked to the government, 
has developed close co-operation with the par-
liament; the forthcoming Italian Parliamentary 
Budget Office will add to the comparative frame-
work a rather unique example of a Fiscal Council 
which is strongly centred in the parliament, both 
from the structural and from the functional point 
of view; finally, the creation of the French Haut 
Conseil de finances will offer a new model of a 
fiscal agency which, mainly due to its structural 
ties with the Cour de comptes, is endowed with a 
strong external legitimation, but, at the same time, 
is supposed to act as a functional interface of the 
parliament.
Upon the basis of this multi-faceted framework, it 
is possible to affirm that the relationship between 
the Fiscal Councils and the parliaments tends to 
be shaped by two factors. The first factor is re-
lated to the influence exercised by the economic, 
political and legal context over the role and posi-
tion of Fiscal Councils: in the European context; 
in fact, only the ‘last generation’ of Fiscal Councils 
are imagined, from the structural point of view, 
as having a solid and direct relationship with the 
parliament. If this trend is strongly conditioned 
by the newly-emerged need to meet EU require-
ments, the crisis itself seems to have encouraged 
the search for a stronger democratic legitimation 
for the mandate of the Fiscal Councils based upon 
the development of a privileged form of interac-
tion with the national parliaments as the authentic 
exponents of popular legitimacy.
The second factor influencing the relationship 
between the parliament and the fiscal institution 
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is instead to be found in its connection with the 
development of an autonomous capacity of the 
parliament to scrutinise the budget. The empirical 
data available reveal that the interaction between 
these two elements is a complex one: when the 
parliament is strong in the exercise of the bud-
getary scrutiny, close co-operation with the fis-
cal institution spontaneously tends to take place 
(see the British case);122 but when this condition 
is not satisfied, the same result can, however, be 
obtained through formal legal provisions which 
encourage the creation of a direct connection be-
tween the Fiscal Councils and the representative 
assemblies (as in the recent Italian constitutional 
reform). In this latter hypothesis, the setting up of 
a fiscal authority can, therefore, affirm itself as an 
independent variable which can contribute to re-
invigorate the parliamentary scrutiny function on 
budgetary and fiscal matters.
The above-mentioned consideration on the re-
lationship between Fiscal Councils and national 
122. The legislature tends to be more interested in the in-
formative and analytical support of the Fiscal Council 
when its daily activities involve the scrutiny of gov-
ernmental choices and performances in the budgetary 
and fiscal policy field.
legislatures does not challenge the importance 
that the economic literature usually attributes to 
the creation of a fiscal institution as a useful mea-
sure capable of providing improved fiscal perfor-
mance. In particular, it does not condition the 
possibility of Fiscal Councils promoting a more 
effective use of public resources,123 but it should, 
instead, be interpreted as a warning that demon-
strates that the implementation of such an objec-
tive is also dependent on the relationship that the 
Fiscal Council develops with all the institutions 
which have an impact on budgetary policy-mak-
ing. To date, the literature has deeply investigated 
the correlation between the effectiveness of fiscal 
institutions and the various elements of the fiscal 
framework, from the formal frameworks (such as 
the constitutional rules on excessive deficits) to 
the informal ones (for instance, the motivation 
of policy-makers).124 All these features undoubt-
123. On the conditions influencing this result, see Lars Jo-
nung & Martin Larch (2006), Improving fiscal policy in 
the EU. The case for independent forecasts, in Economic 
Policy, n. 47, July, p. 491 ff., who in particular under-
line how ‘the establishment of an independent forecaster 
as such may not necessarily guarantee more caution in 
drawing up the budget’ (p. 524).
124. See, in particular, Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. 
edly influence the design of fiscal institutions 
and their capacity to discourage deviations from 
desirable policies; but, if we want to make Fiscal 
Councils work effectively, it seems that the inter-
nal architecture of the form of government, in its 
general functioning and in its specific manifesta-
tions within budgetary and fiscal policy-making, 
should also be taken into consideration. Only by 
considering the overall interaction of such agen-
cies with both the government and the parliament 
– in their role as bodies in charge of the political 
decision-making in the budgetary and fiscal field 
– can we establish the premises for a fiscal archi-
tecture capable of increasing the contribution of 
all the institutions involved.125
Kumar (2007), The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal 
Institutions, cit., p. 31 ff.
125. As observed by Andrea Manzella (2012), Il governo 
democratico della crisi, Presentation held at the 58th 
Conference on Administrative Studies - Varenna, 20-
21 September, in fact, the entrustment of power on 
technical bodies does not bar the essence of politics, 
as the role of democratic institutions can in any case 
be safeguarded through the appointment procedures, 
the introduction of transparency duties for independent 
agencies and the development of cooperative patterns in 
between such agencies and political decision-makers.
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Figure 1 - Features of the Fiscal Councils in the UK, Belgium and Germany with regard to the nature of parliamentary oversight of budget
Nature of the parliamentary oversight of budget Criteria for assessing the Council’s independence (firewalls) 
Type of parliamentary 





appointment and staffing 
Formal influence of the 
Council in the budget and 
fiscal process 
Council’s funding Accountability rules 
(in face of the 
Government - of the  
Parliament) 




of budget carried out 
by the Public Account 
Committee together with 
National Audit Office 
Intense and consolidated 
parliamentary scrutiny 
HoC’s Treasury 
Committee  must 
give its consent on 
the appointment (and 
termination of mandate) 
of 
three members of the 
Office 
The government is 
constantly under the 
Councils’ trial 
Aptitude of the Office 
for serving as a source 
of information and 
analytical studies to 
parliamentary committees 
The Office depends from 
both the Treasury and 
the Parliament for its 
revenues as well as for 
the certification of its 
accounts (subject also 
to the validation of the 




a) by institutional bodies 
(the Treasury; the 
parliament) every year, 
b) by an external 
reviewer (person or body 
appointed by the non-
executive committee 









oversight of budget 
involves both the Budget 
and Finance committee 
and the Assembly 
of the Chamber of 
representatives 
Low-Medium 
development of budgetary 
oversight 
NAI and HIC as 
‘government-oriented’ 
agencies: relationship with 
both the Federal and the 
Regional governments) 
(plurality of institutional 
interlocutors) 
- NAO intervenes mainly 
in the ex ante stage;
 HCF’s contribution is 
focused both on the ex 
ante and on the ex post 
stage. 
NAI is financed by an 
annual grant from the 
Federation, inscribed 
within the budget section 
of the Ministry for 
economic affairs (art. 118 
of the law 21st December 
1994)
According to art. 13 of 
the Arrêté royal of the 3rd 
April 2006, HIC adopts 
its own internal financial 
regulation, which is 
approved by the Ministry 
of finances. 
Both agencies, as public 
institutions, have 
ministers overseeing 
their activity and budget; 
this does not prevent 
them from enjoying 
full independence (they 
respond to government 
requests, but at the same 







Parliamentary scrutiny of 
budget mainly carried out 
by the Budget committee 
of the Bundestag (and in 
particular by Auditing  
subcommittee) - 
Medium development of 
budgetary oversight 
The five members of 
the Council are selected 
among specialists in the 
field of economic theory 
and policy and appointed 
by the Federal President 
on the recommendation 
of the government. 
The Council’s main 
duty is to compile the 
Annual Economic 
Report, presented to the 
Federal Government by 
November 15th, which 
in its turn submits it to 
legislative bodies. Within 
eight weeks the Federal 
government presents its 
comments on the report 
to the legislative bodies. 
The Council is endowed 
with financial autonomy 
and its remuneration 
and expenses are borne 
directly by the Federal 
government
The government-centered 
nature of the body makes 
the Council responsible 
only in face of the 
government. The role of 
political advisor prevails 
over that of scientific 
advisor, thus supporting 
the idea of the Council 
of experts as a ‘parallel 
government’. 
Figure 2 - A comparison between the degree of the national Parliaments’ involvement in the budgetary oversight (ex post scrutiny) and their relationship with Fiscal councils
Country Parliamentary involvement in the 
budgetary oversight (ex post scrutiny) 
Reference institution of the Fiscal Council Interaction Fiscal council -Parliament** 
UK




(Council of economic experts) Medium involvement Federal government Absent (mediated by the government)
Belgium
(High Council of Finance – National 
Accounts Institute) 
Weak involvement Federal and regional governments Extremely weak 
Italy
(Parliamentary Budget Office)* Weak involvement parliament
Extremely intense (the Fiscal Council is 
created by the two Houses)
France
(Haut Conseil des Finances)* High involvement
Court of Auditors 
parliament Intense 
** The interaction Fiscal Council-parliament has been analysed considering as relevant the following elements: the role exercised by the parliament in the appointing procedures; the capacity of 
the Fiscal Council to interact with the legislative process carried out at parliamentary level and the procedures accompanying the submission and discussion of the agency’s fiscal reports within 
the representative assemblies; the dependence of the Council’s funding on a decision to be taken at parliamentary level; the accountability rules assuring an evaluation of elected assemblies over 
the Council’s activity
